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A question frequently asked by defense lawyers is-why do suspects make ad-
missions? It might seem that it never would be in the interest of any person
being investigated to respond to questions.1
I. INTRODUCTION
White collar crime is fundamentally different from the more tradi-
tional "street" crimes that are widely portrayed in both fictional and
quasi-documentary media presentations. Most people have at least a
passing familiarity with basic police investigative tactics, and the Mi-
randa warnings given after an arrest. Yet few could describe how the
government mounts a price-fixing, insider trading, or bank fraud inves-
tigation, much less the pertinent legal issues involving production of
documents and the rights of investigative targets. Street crime gener-
ally entails a discrete event that, upon discovery, is immediately identi-
fiable as suspicious, if not obviously criminal. White collar crime, on
the other hand, involves a process of events, many of which are com-
mon business occurrences that may be otherwise socially desirable.'
The white collar criminal's goal is to conceal all evidence that a crime
has been committed while preserving the patina of legality surrounding
the normal conduct of business."
The differences between street crime and white collar crime are
reflected in the nature of the investigations, the role of the prosecutors
and defense counsel, and the limits the judiciary has placed on the in-
vestigators. Street crime investigations involve classic inquisitorial tech-
niques for witnesses and suspects (e.g., "good cop/bad cop"), using in-
formants to provide incriminating information, and gathering physical
evidence of the crime. The prosecutor's concerns are directed toward
forensic issues, proper custody and identification of physical evidence,
and accurate depictions of the crime scene. Until the 1980s, the bulk of
the Supreme Court's decisions in the criminal law area similarly dealt
with issues raised by the conduct of police investigations into street
1. United States v. Bailin, 736 F. Supp. 1479, 1481 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
2. See William J. Genego, The New Adversary, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 781, 791 (1988) (ex-
plaining that the investigation of street crime involves reconstructing an isolated criminal act,
while white collar cases "usually involve a series of events, not all of which are necessarily crimi-
nal in themselves").
3. See Henry Solomon, The Economist's Perspective on Economic Crime, 14 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 641, 643 (1977). A salient feature of economic crime is concealment of all evidence indicat-
ing that the crime has been committed. Id. Another important distinction is that white collar
crime rarely involves violence directed toward victims or innocent bystanders, which is frequently
an object of street crimes. Id. at 641-42.
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crimes, and reflected the struggle to correct institutional policies that
deprived defendants of their right to defend themselves adequately
while protecting the state's power to prosecute them.
In order to guard the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment
right,5 the Supreme Court adopted a bright-line rule that the right to
counsel attaches when judicial proceedings have been initiated,
"whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information, or arraignment."' For persons subject to custodial interro-
gations, the Court has held that the Fifth Amendment requires police
to discontinue questioning outside the presence of counsel when the sus-
pect invokes the right to counsel.7 The right to counsel is a key means
to protect persons subject to police questioning: coercive police tactics
are prevented through the presence of the subject's attorney. The
Court's decisions focus primarily on determining when this right
attaches. 8
The correlative issue faced by the Court was determining the ex-
tent to which the police could pursue other methods of investigation in
gathering physical evidence of the crime, even if the defendant invoked
the Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent. The government may
compel a person to provide incriminating evidence, except where pro-
viding the information entails a testimonial communication by the wit-
ness.' A defendant may be forced to give blood samples, 10 handwriting
exemplars,"1 voice exemplars,12 and even dress in clothing worn by the
perpetrator of the crime.13 The Supreme Court's decisions involve a
4. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (recognizing the Fifth Amendment
right to counsel for custodial interrogation of suspects); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (recognizing the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in felony cases); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to state violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation" The Chang-
ing Vision of the Right to Counsel, 105 HARV. L. REV. 670, 675 (1992) (noting the Sixth Amend-
ment cases that were shaped by a series of indigent defendants convicted of street crimes).
5. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
6. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972); see also Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 231-
32 (1977) (holding that the right to counsel attaches at the initial appearance before a
magistrate).
7. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8. See Karlan, supra note 4, at 698.
9. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976).
10. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
11. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
12. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
13. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
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delicate, and not always consistent, balance between limiting the ability
of the police to entice defendants into providing incriminating admis-
sions, and allowing the government to force a suspect to perform cer-
tain nontestimonial acts that can be highly incriminating. Nevertheless,
the case law focuses primarily on the rights of defendants accused of
street crimes vis-A-vis the police, and the prosecutor remains largely in
the background.
Beginning in the mid-1970s, in the aftermath of the Watergate
and foreign government bribery scandals, the federal government be-
gan targeting white collar crime as a high-priority prosecutorial area.1'
By its very nature, the criminal activity involved is much more complex
than street crime, usually consisting of a number of events spread over
an extended period of time, with the "real" evidence frequently buried
in reams of business and corporate records relating to numerous trans-
actions."8 The prosecutor is faced with a "cold trail" because the al-
leged crime has often been completed, meaning the investigation may
be years removed from the actual violations. The locus of the investiga-
tion has also shifted from the local police force to federal prosecutors
and pertinent investigative agencies. Moreover, the constitutional issues
raised by white collar investigations do not have a clear starting point
similar to those encountered in street crime investigations, such as an
investigatory stop, custodial interrogation, or execution of a search.
The investigatory processes in white collar cases raise issues that
have little relevance to street crimes. The investigations require access
to documents that detail the conduct of the transactions, especially the
flow of funds and timing of decisions, and the statements of partici-
pants, both innocent and suspect, about the process of events."8 White
14. See Genego, supra note 2, at 789-90 (noting that, until the 1970s, federal prosecutorial
resources were primarily directed against crimes against individuals and property); Richard P.
Lynch & Frank A. Ray, The National District Attorneys Association Economic Crime Project: A
National Experience in Prosecution Confederation, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 781, 782 (1977) (stat-
ing that the growth of consumer groups, Watergate, corporate misdeeds, and the emergence of
investigative reporting contributed to the growing interest in prosecuting economic crimes).
15. See Howard A. Matz & Stephen V. Wilson, Obtaining Evidence for Federal Economic
Crime Prosecutions: An Overview and Analysis of Investigative Methods, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
651, 651 (1977) ("The 'proof' consists not merely of relatively few items of real evidence but of a
large roomful of often obscure documents."). This article focuses on the investigation and prosecu-
tion of white collar criminals. Much of the discussion, however, applies to investigations of large-
scale drug conspiracies, especially those that involve money-laundering and other economic activ-
ity related to processing the proceeds of the narcotics sales. See Genego, supra note 2, at 791
(noting that federal drug prosecutions often consist of complex conspiracy charges and investiga-
tions that are similar to those of white collar crimes).
16. See Genego, supra note 2, at 791 (noting that investigations involve following paper
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collar crimes often involve a group of people acting in concert with
various levels of culpability, so investigations usually proceed from the
bottom up in a piecemeal fashion, using the less-culpable to supply in-
formation against the organizers. As the focal point of the investigation
shifts to the prosecutor subpoenaing documents and seeking incriminat-
ing statements, there is less direct interaction with the defendant and
more with the attorneys retained to represent witnesses and targets of
investigations. With the development of a defense bar devoted primar-
ily to white collar cases, the attorneys become involved in the process
well before the initiation of criminal proceedings, the traditional trigger
of the right to counsel.17
The principal differences between street crime and white collar in-
vestigations are twofold: First, the key players in the white collar inves-
tigation are the prosecutor and law enforcement agents assigned to
work with the prosecuting body on one side, and counsel for witnesses
and targets on the other side; second, the timing of the prosecutor's and
defense attorney's involvement is earlier in the investigative process,
well before Miranda and Sixth Amendment rights are implicated.',
The presence of counsel on both sides of the investigation means that
defendants are less likely to be subject to direct coercive actions be-
cause each step will be scrutinized by lawyers. At the same time, there
is a crucial similarity between street crime and white collar investiga-
tions: The government still seeks admissions by the defendant that can
be used to establish guilt at trial. For defense lawyers counselling wit-
nesses not cooperating with the government, the goal remains the same:
They seek to keep the prosecutor and government agents from receiving
trails); Earl J. Silbert, Defense Counsel in the Grand Jury-The Answer to the White Collar
Criminal's Prayers, 15 At. CRIM. L. REv. 293, 293 (1978) [hereinafter Defense Counsel] (stating
that successful investigations are "wholly dependent on the ability to compel the production of
documents and the testimony of witnesses, particularly those with inside knowledge").
17. See Genego, supra note 2, at 797 (explaining that defense of white collar and drug
conspiracy cases begins before any charges filed); Karlan, supra note 4, at 679-86 (describing the
growth of "relational representation" by lawyers of clients on a continuing basis in white collar
and drug conspiracy investigations and prosecutions).
18. Fourth Amendment issues are rarely raised in white collar investigations because the
bulk of the evidence is gathered by means of grand jury or administrative subpoenas and sum-
mons, with search warrants being used to a lesser extent. Extensive litigation involving exceptions
to the warrant requirement, such as automobile searches and searches incident to arrest, generally
does not arise in white collar cases because the evidence needed to conduct the investigation is
neither on the defendant's person, nor in an automobile or other nearby container. The production
of documents is often agreed upon in advance by the prosecutor and an attorney for the producing
witness or entity. Moreover, grand jury appearances to produce documents are uncommon.
19931
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
information, both testimonial and documentary, that may be
incriminating.
The expansion of white collar investigations works a subtle change
in the issues presented to the courts. The need for access to documents
has moved defendants from the police interrogation room to the grand
jury, where the threat of unfair coercion is minimal. To gather incrimi-
nating admissions that are otherwise not available to the government
agent or prosecutor in direct dealings with defense counsel, informants
and cooperating witnesses can provide both historical information and a
path to reach investigative targets and defendants. 19 Although the
courts were willing to impose institutional restrictions on prosecuting
criminals, such as Miranda warnings and counsel for indigent defend-
ants, they have been much less willing to dictate categorical limitations
to prosecutors and government agents investigating white collar crime.
The Supreme Court recognized explicitly in Braswell v. United States20
that white collar crimes are more complex and harder to prosecute, and
therefore refused to impose bright-line restrictions on the prosecution's
access to documents and ability to gather information from participants
in the process of events under investigation.21 This "white collar ration-
ale" allows courts to find that the obstacles inherent in investigating
complex economic crimes weigh in favor of avoiding further proscrip-
tions on the government's ability to discover information, because those
proscriptions will give defendants additional tools to conceal their crim-
inal activity.
The focal point of much of the sparring between prosecutors and
defense attorneys has been over subpoenas for documents and the right
to counsel at the pre-indictment stage of investigations. The primary
issues raised concern the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
including arguments regarding the application of the attorney-client
privilege. In the few instances in which the Supreme Court has consid-
ered drawing bright-line rules in that context, it has decided in favor of
19. Federal Rule of Evidence 410 bars the introduction of statements made in the course of
plea discussions which do not result in a guilty plea. See FED. R. EVID. 410(4).
20. 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
21. See id. at 115-16. The Court recognized that the Fifth Amendment privilege for records
custodians of collective entities "would have a detrimental impact on the Government's efforts to
prosecute 'white-collar crime,' one of the most serious problems confronting law enforcement au-
thorities." Id. The Court noted that permitting records custodians to assert a Fifth Amendment
privilege over document production would stymie efforts to prosecute both individuals and organi-
zations involved in criminal enterprises. Id.
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the government.2 2 Moreover, the courts have shown a willingness to
limit defendants' ability to use their attorneys as a shield by expanding
the reach of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege,
and by determining that client identity and fee information are not
privileged. 23 In response, defendants have turned to the ethics rules
that govern law practice to try to create limits on the types of investi-
gatory tactics the government may use. They have also sought assis-
tance from the courts to enact administrative rules that constrain pros-
ecutors and, indirectly, the investigative agents who work under the
prosecutor's direction.24 These efforts have by and large borne little
22. See United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992) (holding that prosecutors need
not present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury); Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S.
617 (1989) (upholding constitutionality of asset forfeiture law even though it may limit defend-
ant's right to counsel of choice); Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988) (holding that
custodians of corporate records have no Fifth Amendment privilege in connection with production
of corporate documents); Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988) (finding no Sixth Amend-
ment violation when a court disqualifies an attorney for potential conflict of interest even though
the client waived the conflict).
23. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 (1989) (holding that, upon a lesser evi-
dentiary showing, a court may conduct an in camera review to determine whether certain evidence
is not privileged under the "crime-fraud" exception); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 926 F.2d 1423,
1431 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that fee information and client identity are not privileged unless
disclosure would also reveal privileged communication). Defendants have achieved some success in
protecting communications through joint defense agreements. The courts accept the joint defense
privilege as an extension of the attorney-client privilege, and recognize its value in allowing de-
fendants to put forward a defense while not restricting its application. See United States v.
Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 244 (2d Cir. 1989) (setting forth the requirements to establish the
joint defense privilege); infra text accompanying notes 192-216 (discussing the joint defense
privilege).
24. See, e.g., Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd., 975 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1992) (rejecting local
Pennsylvania rule that requires prior judicial approval of subpoenas directed to attorneys); United
States v. Kublock, 832 F.2d 649 (1st Cir.), a ffd by an equally divided court, 832 F.2d 664 (1st
Cir. 1987) (en banc) (per curiam) (upholding adoption by district court of local Massachusetts
rule that requires prior judicial approval of subpoenas directed to attorneys); United States v.
Infelise, 773 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (rejecting the application of Disciplinary Rule 7-104 to
limit a government agent's pre-indictment contacts with grand jury target represented by coun-
sel); see also infra text accompanying notes 238-60 (discussing judicial rules for attorney subpoe-
nas) and notes 261-76 (discussing application of DR 7-104 to white collar investigations).
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fruit, despite support from commentators, 25 with few meaningful re-
strictions imposed on prosecutors by the courts.26
The complexity of white collar crime investigations has also led to
fragmentation in the decisions. These cases involve a variety of issues,
and courts are still fashioning the rules that apply to prosecutors and
agents investigating complex economic crimes. As such, the decisions
look at discrete issues and do not focus on the overarching issue of how
the court should delineate the relationship between the government and
white collar defendants. Courts generally accept the white collar crime
rationale, as articulated by the Supreme Court in Braswell, that the
rules should not hamper the investigation of complex criminal activity,
and consequently do not impose broad standards that restrict prosecu-
tors. Instead, a survey of the development of the law surrounding white
collar investigations shows a continuing trend in favor of the govern-
ment, both through the use of select bright-line rules giving prosecutors
broad power, and a case-by-case review that may punish prosecutorial
misconduct but avoids imposing categorical limitations on the govern-
ment's discretion to pursue investigations.
This article analyzes the trend in white collar cases by reviewing
the disparate issues that can arise in an investigation, and the areas
that courts are struggling to resolve. Part II reviews the issue of pro-
duction of documents, and discusses how the Supreme Court's use of
the white collar rationale in Braswell has been extended to other issues
related to the production of documents. The article then turns to the
related area of witness immunity, and considers the scope of immunity
for custodians producing documents. Part III treats the issue of the
prosecutor's contacts with defendants and targets of investigations, and
25. See Daniel J. Capra, Deterring the Formation of the Attorney-Client Relationship: Dis-
closure of Client Identity, Payment of Fees, and Communications by Fiduciaries, 4 GEo. J LE-
GAL ETHIcs 235, 258 (1990) [hereinafter Attorney-Client Relationship] (arguing that the rule
permitting disclosure of client identity and fee information is overbroad and it unnecessarily im-
pedes legal representation); Genego, supra note 2, at 867 (proposing judicial review of attorney
subpoenas); David Rudovsky, The Right to Counsel Under Attack, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 1969
(1988) (arguing that defendants should have the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice in
complex criminal matters); Max D. Stern & David Hoffman, Privileged Informers: The Attorney
Subpoena Problem and a Proposal for Reform, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1783, 1830 (1988) (proposing
court regulation of attorney subpoenas and supporting privileged status for client identity and fee
information).
26. In 1992, the United States Department of Justice proposed rules for contacts with rep-
resented persons in order to create uniform standards for federal prosecutors. The proposed rules
would prevent state bar rules from being used to inhibit investigations. See 57 Fed. Reg. 54737
(1992) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 77) (proposed Nov. 20, 1992).
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their attorneys, and examines how the interrelated areas of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, the attorney-client privilege, and the ethi-
cal rules have been analyzed by the courts. Although the decisions are
not entirely consistent, the courts have begun to adapt the white collar
rationale from the production of documents context to questions related
to direct contacts with witnesses and attorneys. The article concludes
that so long as the white collar rationale is the predominant theme in
reviewing challenges to prosecutors' and government agents' conduct of
white collar investigations, the courts will avoid adopting bright-line
rules proposed by defendants and at best take a case-by-case approach
that will only rarely invalidate the particular use of an investigative
tactic.
II. REACHING CORPORATE RECORDS AND CUSTODIANS: DOCUMENTS
AND THE SCOPE OF IMMUNITY
When a course of business conduct is the subject of a criminal
inquiry, the prosecutor must review extensive documentation concern-
ing both the potential violation and numerous other transactions that,
while related, are not immediately suspicious. For example, bank fraud
often involves loans secured by real estate or receivables that may raise
questions concerning the value of the collateral, the propriety of per-
sonal or corporate financial statements, and the disposition of funds. A
loan file can range from a few pages to dozens of binders; any number
of transactions involving different borrowers, lenders and entities may
relate to possible criminal activity. Complex investigations involving
fraud in health care, housing, government contracts, and securities im-
plicate a wide range of business activities that routinely involve the cre-
ation of thousands of pages of documents by numerous legitimate
organizations.
The primary tool available to federal prosecutors for gathering
documents is the grand jury subpoena. 7 The grand jury is empowered
to secure every person's evidence,28 which includes documents and tan-
gible items, and it may invoke the court's power to compel the appear-
ance of witnesses and production of documents.29 Search warrants may
27. See Matz & Wilson, supra note 15, at 683 ("[Flederal grand jury subpoenas ... may
be the most potent investigative tool in the prosecutors' arsenal.").
28. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972).
29. United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992). The grand jury is not limited in the
matters it can investigate, and may conduct an inquiry "merely on suspicion that the law is being
violated, or even because it wants assurance that it has not." United States v. Morton Salt Co.,
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also be issued by the court to secure documents, but they require proof
of probable cause that a crime took place, which may not always be
possible at an early stage of a white collar investigation. Moreover, the
warrant must describe the items to be seized with particularity, 30 re-
quiring detailed knowledge of the documents related to the transac-
tions, thereby putting the investigation at risk if the warrant misses
relevant items that may have been removed or about which the prose-
cutor is unaware. Search warrants are generally a less appealing means
to obtain documents because of the greater burden placed on the prose-
cution, although when there is a threat that documents may be de-
stroyed or tampered with, the warrant is an effective means of seizing
evidence before it loses its probative value.31
Because the government obtains the bulk of its documents through
grand jury subpoenas prior to an indictment, the overriding issue is the
applicability of any privileges a witness can assert to resist producing
documents. In Braswell v. United States,12 the Supreme Court barred
custodians of corporate records from asserting a Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination in the production of documents.
This eliminates any possibility that documents designated as corporate
records can be withheld from the grand jury.33 For documents subpoe-
naed from a business organization, witnesses are left with arguing ei-
ther that they are not corporate custodians, or that the documents are
not corporate records. The witness can also try to establish that the
business falls within the narrow range of entities that are sole proprie-
torships, or so small as to be considered an individual business, thereby
making the documents private papers. Courts have generally rejected
arguments to resist the production of documents in favor of a broad
approach that defines who can qualify as a custodian and what items
constitute records of a corporation.
338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950). A grand jury subpoena compelling one's appearance can be served
at any place in the United States. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(e)(1).
30. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (upholding warrant that described
categories of documents to be seized).
31. The government may also seek voluntary production of documents, and corporate orga-
nizations will frequently cooperate with an investigation by providing access to the documents. A
bank, however, generally may not disclose customer records to the federal government without
first receiving a grand jury subpoena, an administrative subpoena, or a search warrant. See Right
to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 §§ 1101-1122, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1988).
32. 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
33. Id. at 110. "[A] custodian's assumption of his representative capacity leads to certain
obligations, including the duty to produce corporate records on proper demand by the Govern-
ment." Id.
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Braswell also recognized that the custodian's act of production of
corporate records cannot be used against the custodian personally,
granting a watered-down type of immunity scope of which is unclear.
3 4
The testimony of participants in the economic activity under investiga-
tion is crucial to explaining what role different persons and entities
played in the transactions, and witnesses often appear under a grant of
immunity. Courts have, however, apparently been willing to permit the
government to make certain nonevidentiary uses of immunized testi-
mony,35 and Braswell's protection for corporate custodians is not as ex-
tensive as that provided to witnesses compelled to testify under a grant
of immunity.36
A. Braswell and the Corporate Custodian
The issue of production of business records has a tortured history.
The question of whether the corporate custodian can resist a subpoena
for documents remains heavily litigated because the Supreme Court
has not been willing to establish clear rules that settle the scope of the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Instead, the
Court conditions its decisions by recognizing that certain types of busi-
nesses or categories of documents may, or may not, be protected by an
assertion of the privilege. The scope of the Fifth Amendment is crucial
because the records maintained by businesses can disclose the owner-
ship of illicit proceeds, the participation of various individuals, and
even the defendant's knowledge of the illegality of a transaction. The
contents of the documents are what is important to a successful prose-
cution, yet the legal analysis turns on the status of the person subpoe-
naed and the entity that created them. By focusing on issues that are at
best peripheral to the investigation, such as whether a document is
"corporate" or "personal," courts have made the analysis unduly
complicated.
1. Development of the Collective Entity Doctrine
In Boyd v. United States,3" the Supreme Court held that govern-
34. See id. at 117-18; see also John M. Grogan, Jr., Fifth Amendment-The Act of Pro-
duction Privilege: The Supreme Court's Portrait of a Dualistic Record Custodian, 79 J. CRIm. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 701, 732 (1988) (arguing that Braswell confers constructive use immunity in
reality if not in name).
35. See infra text accompanying notes 165-79.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 165-79.
37. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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ment seizures of private property, whether by grand jury subpoena or
search warrant, were unconstitutional violations of a person's right to
privacy. The "private" papers at issue were invoices held by a busi-
ness partnership related to its import of glass for which the proper du-
ties had not been paid. Boyd's celebration of the right to privacy has
been noted as a crucial step in the development of civil liberties, 3  but
the holding's application to documents of the type at issue in the case
has been completely rejected.40 If taken to its logical extreme, Boyd
would prevent the government from obtaining any documents that
qualified as the property of the person subpoenaed, including a corpora-
tion, because of the recognition that their entity has certain property
rights under the Constitution.41
The Supreme Court retreated from the extremism of Boyd's pro-
tection of business records in Hale v. Henkel,42 where it held that a
corporation had no Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse to produce
documents pursuant to a subpoena.4 3 Hale is the beginning of the "col-
lective entity" rule, under which "corporations and collective entities
are treated differently from individuals" for the purpose of application
of the privilege against self-incrimination.44 Moreover, the Court justi-
fied its decision on the basis that a contrary holding would have a dele-
terious effect on prosecutions of corporate crime.4 This justification is
38. Id. at 630; see also Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected
Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REv. 945, 948-52 (1977) (discuss-
ing the formalistic approach to property rights that was exemplified in Boyd).
39. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[Boyd
is] a case that will be remembered as long as civil liberty lives in the United States").
40. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408-09 (1976) ("[T]he precise claim sus-
tained in Boyd would now be rejected .... [T]he prohibition against forcing the production of
private papers has long been a rule searching for a rationale .... ).
41. See Robert Heidt, The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Documents-Cutting Fisher's
Tangled Line, 49 Mo. L. REV. 439, 448 (1984) ("Logically, Boyd would suppress property owned
by corporations as well as by natural persons.").
42. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
43. Id. at 74. The rationale for denying corporations the privilege against self-incrimination
is that they are "creature[s] of the state," and the state retains certain visitorial powers over
corporations and their records. Id. at 74-75.
44. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 104 (1988). The Court noted, one hopes ironi-
cally, that the collective entity rule "has a lengthy and distinguished pedigree." Id.
45. See Hale, 201 U.S. at 74.
If, whenever an officer or employ6 of a corporation were summoned before a grand jury as
a witness he could refuse to produce the books and documents of such corporation, upon
the ground that they would incriminate the corporation itself, it would result in the failure
of a large number of cases where the illegal combination was determinable only upon the
examination of such papers.
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unnecessary to the decision, but it highlights the Court's awareness
that the application of the Fifth Amendment should accommodate the
needs of effective law enforcement involving economic activity.
In Wilson v. United States,46 the Court extended the reasoning of
Hale by holding that the custodian of corporate records cannot resist
producing documents even if the custodian created them and they
would be personally incriminating. 47 Wilson also indicated that a cor-
poration cannot have a form of derivative immunity based on the custo-
dian's assertion of the Fifth Amendment. 8 In Wheeler v. United
States,49 the Court held that the dissolution of the corporation does not
affect the applicability of the privilege, but rather the character of the
documents as corporate records determines whether they must be
produced. 50
While the collective entity rule presents a seemingly simple guide
to determine the scope of the Fifth Amendment, it does not address the
complexity of modern business organization. Economic activity occurs
through a number of entities organized to serve different purposes and
to provide various benefits to their owners. Businesses operate through
a variety of models, such as partnerships, corporations, sole proprietor-
ships, and trusts, and each form has different permutations applicable
to particular circumstances. Moreover, the size of an entity does not
require that it adhere to a single organizational model; a corporation
may have a single employee-owner while a sole proprietorship can have
millions of dollars of revenue.
In United States v. White,51 the Supreme Court recognized that
the government's ability to pursue economic crimes could not be lim-
ited to transactions by state-chartered corporations. The Court held
that a collective entity could not assert a Fifth Amendment privilege
and defined it as a "business organization that under all 'the circum-
stances ... has a character so impersonal in the scope of its member-
ship and activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the
46. 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
47. Id. at 384-85; see also Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394 (1911) (holding that
documents in the custody of a corporate custodian, not the corporation, must be produced).
48. See Wilson, 221 U.S. at 384-86.
49. 226 U.S. 478 (1913).
50. Id. at 490.
51. 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
19931
418 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
purely private or personal interests of its constituents, but rather to em-
body their common or group interests only." 52
The Court again invoked the rationale of combatting corporate
crime to justify the decision, noting that if "the cloak of the privilege
[were] thrown around these impersonal records and documents, effec-
tive enforcement of many federal and state laws would be impossi-
ble."' 53 Although White sought to delineate the scope of the privilege,
the Court's definition is vague because there are no clear means of dis-
tinguishing between personal and group interests. While the Court does
not want to hamper prosecution of economic crimes unduly, the vague-
ness in White exemplifies the Court's hesitancy in making its rule too
broad, because then even the smallest economic unit would be subject
to producing documents without any constitutional protection.
The Court found that White's vague definition needed further re-
finement in Bellis v. United States,54 which involved a subpoena for
records from a defunct three-person law firm. In exploring the "outer
limits" of White, the Court expanded the definition, stating that a col-
lective entity exists when the entity is
an organization ... recognized as an independent entity apart from its individual
members. The group must be relatively well organized and structured, and not
merely a loose, informal association of individuals. It must maintain a distinct set
of organizational records, and recognize rights in its members of control and
access to them. And the records subpoenaed must in fact be organizational
records held in a representative capacity' 5
Bellis provided a test as malleable as a court could wish, listing
factors that defy easy categorization as determinative of the proper de-
cision in a case. While the Court adopted a position that may deny the
Fifth Amendment privilege to any business entity, it continued to limit
the scope of its decision by stating that the case might be decided dif-
ferently if the organization "involved a small family partnership ... or
... if there were some other pre-existing relationship of confidentiality
among the partners. '56
52. Id. at 701. The organization at issue was a labor union. A subpoena required the union
to provide copies of its constitution, by-laws, and certain records showing collections of fees from
employers. Id. at 695.
53. Id. at 700.
54. 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
55. Id. at 92-93. The Court found that the White formulation could not be "reduced to a
simple proposition based solely upon the size of the organization." Id. at 100.
56. Id. at 101.
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Bellis signaled the trend in the Supreme Court's decisions con-
cerning application of the privilege against self-incrimination to busi-
ness entities, in which the Court refused to delineate the scope of its
rules by reserving certain areas from the rule announced in the case. In
White and Bellis, the Court refused to acknowledge that its decisions
mean that any business organization, whether large or small, sole pro-
prietorship or public stock corporation, cannot assert the privilege
against self-incrimination. Instead, the Court sought to adhere to the
privacy rationale first announced in Boyd by paying lip-service to the
need to protect certain areas from governmental scrutiny, although it
could not define those areas beyond a general description of them as
possibly falling outside the decision in the case. 57
2. Fisher v. United States: Creation of the Act of Production Privi-
lege to Subpoenas for Documents
Rather than continue down the road of trying to define what types
of business entities could not refuse to produce records, the Supreme
Court adopted an entirely new form of analysis for determining the
application of the Fifth Amendment privilege to subpoenas for docu-
ments in Fisher v. United States.58 The Court reoriented the Fifth
Amendment analysis to focus on the communicative aspect of the pro-
duction of records, holding that the witness subpoenaed to produce
records may assert a privilege only if the witness "is compelled to make
a testimonial communication that is incriminating."5 9 The Court found
that the very act of production may have communicative aspects,
wholly apart from the incriminating content of the documents, that
permit the witness to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. 0
The Fisher approach is complex because a court must determine a
number of issues before concluding that the privilege applies. First, the
production of the documents must be testimonial, which itself entails a
three-part analysis, and second, the communication must be incriminat-
57. See id. at 95 (stating that its decisions reflect the policy of protecting individual's right
to privacy). For an extensive analysis of the shifting rationales of the decisions applying the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to collective entities, see Robert P. Mosteller,
Simplifying Subpoena Law: Taking the Fifth Amendment Seriously, 73 VA. L. REV. 1, 51-59
(1987); Scott D. Price, Note, Braswell v. United States: An Examination of a Custodian's Fifth
Amendment Right to Avoid Personal Production of Corporate Records, 34 VILL L. REV. 353,
357-62 (1989).
58. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
59. Id. at 408.
60. Id. at 410.
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ing.61 The testimonial prong of the Fisher test requires a determination
of whether the production of documents communicates (1) existence;
(2) possession or control by the witness; or (3) authenticity. Even if the
act of production is testimonial; that communication may not be in-
criminating if the government can prove that the information conveyed
by producing documents was a "foregone conclusion. ' 2
The first prong of Fisher can best be understood as representing
links in a chain: If there is a question about the very existence of the
subpoenaed documents, then their production is testimonial. If the gov-
ernment can prove independent knowledge of their existence, then the
issue is whether production of the documents will demonstrate the wit-
ness's possession of the items beyond the information the government
already has about their control. If possession or control is already
known or otherwise irrelevant, then the question is whether production
will authenticate the records for introduction at trial. A document can
be authenticated by a number of methods. The custodian producing the
records is not necessarily required to testify about the authenticity of
the documents because other witnesses may provide the necessary evi-
dence to authenticate them."a As each link in the chain is established,
the testimonial aspect of the act of production diminishes.64
While Fisher adopted a new form of analysis for the Fifth Amend-
ment, the Supreme Court did not shed its reticence about adopting
clear rules, if the act of production privilege can even be described as
such. After savaging the rationale of Boyd, the Court stated that the
documents at issue were not "private papers" and refused to determine
whether production of that type of document could be compelled under
its analysis.65 The Court could neither bring itself to abandon com-
pletely the private property approach of Boyd, nor address how the act
61. Id.
62. Id. at 411. Fisher involved a subpoena for tax workpapers served on the attorney repre-
senting the targets of a grand jury investigation. After first holding that the attorney can chal-
lenge the subpoena if the there is a valid attorney-client privilege, the Court held that there was
no valid privilege claim because the existence and possession of the papers were a foregone conclu-
sion, and the act of production would not authenticate the documents. Id. at 411-12.
63. See FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(1) (testimony of witness with knowledge).
64. For an extensive consideration of the Fisher act of production analysis, see Samuel A.
Alito, Jr., Documents and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 48 U. PiTT. L. REv. 27, 42-51
(1986); Heidt, supra note 41, at 473-82; Mosteller, supra note 57, at 11-40.
65. 425 U.S. at 414 ("Whether the Fifth Amendment would shield the taxpayer from pro-
ducing his own tax records in his possession is a question not involved here; for the papers de-
manded here are not his 'private papers' . ...") (citing United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616
(1886)).
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of production analysis could be reconciled with the collective entity
doctrine. Much like the broad definition in Bellis, Fisher's new ap-
proach was sufficiently vague to continue the indeterminacy in the ap-
plication of the Fifth Amendment.
More importantly, Fisher's analysis is unnecessarily complicated
and focuses on one aspect of the subpoena process, the act of produc-
tion, which is largely irrelevant to the real issues of the grand jury
investigation. One commentator aptly noted that "[b]oth prosecutors
and witnesses served with document subpoenas are invariably inter-
ested in the documents' contents, not the testimonial component of the
act of production.' 6  The majority of subpoenas in white collar investi-
gations are directed to third parties, such as banks, brokerage houses,
and customers of the targets with no direct interest in the investigation.
For those few subpoenas to targets of investigations, the government
will probably know the types of documents it wants, because they will
have been created in the normal course of business. The grand jury
subpoena will usually be directed to the corporation's custodian, and
the issue of possession and authenticity will probably be of minor im-
portance. If the government does not know that the documents exist, or
where they are located, the subpoena probably will be unproductive be-
cause it is doubtful that a guilty party will voluntarily turn over incul-
patory records.67
Nevertheless, Fisher elevates the act of production to the linchpin
of the Fifth Amendment analysis, requiring courts to jump through a
number of hoops to reach a decision that masks the real issue underly-
ing the assertion of the privilege: Can the witness protect the docu-
66. Alito, supra note 64, at 46. Judge Alito reviews the history of the act of production
doctrine, noting that it was originally proposed by Professor Wigmore as a counterposition to
Boyd. Id. at 45. He argues that the doctrine "was an academic creation and found judicial accept-
ance more as an excuse than a reason. The theory did not develop because any real witnesses
balked at surrendering documents for fear that the act of production would really be incriminat-
ing." Id. at 46.
67. See id. at 47 ("Where possession cannot be independently shown, common sense and
experience suggest that incriminating evidence frequently will not be produced."); see also Greg-
ory I. Massing, Note, The Fifth Amendment, the Attorney-Client Privilege, and the Prosecution
of White-Collar Crime, 75 VA. L. REV. 1179, 1202 (1989) (stating that a broad document sub-
poena "virtually invites noncompliance ... because it gives the custodian an opportunity to sort
out those documents that are incriminating and retain them."). Judge Alito notes the analogous
situation of subpoenaing poison from a defendant charged with poisoning his wife: "Mr. X would
have to be exceptionally honest or exceptionally stupid to turn it over." Alito, supra note 64, at 47
n. 104.
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ments, which are presumably incriminating, from discovery by the
government?
Despite these problems, the Court affirmed the act of production
doctrine eight years later in United States v. Doe. 8 It held that the
custodian of records for a sole proprietorship can invoke the privilege to
resist a subpoena for records of the business. Doe is part of the line of
cases that reaches back to the collective entity decisions which hinted
that certain types of organizations may be able to assert the Fifth
Amendment privilege to prevent the production of documents even
though a corporate custodian could not block production of the same
items.6 9 Rather than review the scope of the collective entity doctrine
for sole proprietorships, however, Doe applied the new act of produc-
tion analysis to determine that the custodian's production of the records
of a business he owns may be incriminating, apart from the content of
the records.70
Doe is important not so much for what it says about subpoenas
directed to sole proprietorships, but more for how far the Fisher ap-
proach can swing the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege away
from requiring production of business records and toward restricting
the enforcement of subpoenas. Although Doe addresses a particular
type of organization-the sole proprietorship-its application of the act
of production doctrine is not limited to a particular form of business
entity. Instead, Doe signals that any custodian has a chance of convinc-
ing a court that the production of documents will be personally incrimi-
nating, and thus protects the documents from disclosure. The incentive
to litigate privilege issues is dramatically increased if Fisher applies to
all custodians of records because Doe calls into question the collective
entity doctrine.71
68. 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
69. See supra text accompanying notes 51-57 (reviewing White and Bellis).
70. The Court concluded that the contents of the records were not privileged. Doe, 465 U.S.
at 612. The Court, however, adopted the lower court findings that a sole proprietor acts in a
personal capacity in producing documents and the act of production involved testimonial self-
incrimination. Id. at 608, 613. The decision's net effect was to protect the content of the records,
unless the government granted the witness act of production immunity.
71. One court interpreted Fisher as subsuming the collective entity doctrine. See In re
Grand Jury Matter, 768 F.2d 525, 528-29 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc) (indicating that the type of
entity is not relevant and that the only significant factor is whether act of production is communi-
cative). Some commentators have also argued that the collective entity rule should be replaced by
the act of production doctrine. See Mosteller, supra note 57, at 71 (stating that the collective
entity doctrine appears to lack a solid foundation); Nancy J. King, Note, Fifth Amendment Privi-
lege for Producing Corporate Documents, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1544, 1562 (1986) (arguing that the
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3. Braswell v. United States: The Collective Entity Doctrine Reigns
Supreme
Fisher and Doe do not discuss the line of cases creating the collec-
tive entity doctrine because the subpoenas at issue were not directed to
custodians of corporate records, but dealt with documents relating to
individuals (Fisher) and a sole proprietorship (Doe). The unresolved
issue was whether the act of production analysis of the Fifth Amend-
ment superseded the decisions requiring the production of corporate
records. The question was crucial because neither Fisher nor Doe made
any reference to the white collar rationale supporting earlier holdings
that compelled custodians to produce the records of business organiza-
tions. If the act of production doctrine made the cases beginning with
Hale v. Henkel irrelevant, then the Court would have to consider
whether the need to combat economic crimes could be reconciled with
the assertion of a privilege that might effectively block the production
of business records once thought so crucial to effective law
enforcement.
Rather than grapple with the hard issue of reconciling the compet-
ing rationales, the Supreme Court elevated the collective entity doc-
trine above the act of production privilege for the records of most busi-
ness entities. In Braswell v. United States,72 the Court held that
"without regard to whether the subpoena is addressed to the corpora-
tion, or as here, to the individual in his capacity as custodian, . . . a
corporate custodian such as petitioner may not resist a subpoena for
corporate records on Fifth Amendment grounds. 7 3 Braswell was the
sole shareholder of two Mississippi corporations, with his wife and
mother as nominal directors and officers of the companies. The subpoe-
nas were addressed to Braswell as president of the corporations and
sought a broad variety of standard business records. 4 After reviewing
the "distinguished pedigree" of the collective entity doctrine, the Court
rejected the argument that Fisher and Doe made the doctrine "obso-
principles behind collective entity doctrine do not justify withholding privilege for testimony im-
plicit in producing documents). But see Alito, supra note 64, at 71 (arguing that Fisher and Doe
should necessitate only small changes in traditional rules regarding subpoenas to entities).
72. 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
73. Id. at 108-09.
74. Id. at 101. The subpoena sought virtually all records that a business could produce, and
was not specific as to particular types of documents or transactions. Id. at 101 & n.l. Under the
act of production analysis, the government probably had a difficult time demonstrating that the
production of the documents did not communicate the existence of particular records if they were
in fact incriminating.
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lete. ' 7 5 Instead, the Court applied an agency theory to determine the
status of the corporate custodian, finding that the person producing the
records merely acts on the entity's behalf as its agent and not in any
personal capacity. 8
Braswell reaffirmed the white collar rationale recognized in earlier
cases, noting that if corporate custodians could assert any Fifth
Amendment privilege it "would have a detrimental impact on the Gov-
ernment's efforts to prosecute 'white-collar crime,' one of the most seri-
ous problems confronting law enforcement authorities."' 7 Barring as-
sertion of the Fifth Amendment by custodians created a problem of
how to treat the testimonial aspect of the production of records recog-
nized in Fisher. Rather than giving the prosecution the unfettered right
to use the act of production in any way it wished, Braswell held that
"certain consequences flow from the fact that the custodian's act of
production is one in his representative capacity rather than personal
capacity .... [The prosecution] may make no evidentiary use of the
'individual act' against the individual. 178 The prohibition on evidentiary
use is not a requirement that the court grant a witness constructive use
immunity, because Doe explicitly rejected such a proposal in connec-
tion with the production of documents.7 9 While the Court denied that
its holding granted a form of immunity, it failed to explain either the
constitutional basis for the evidentiary prohibition or what use the gov-
ernment could make of the act of production.
Braswell resolves the primary Fifth Amendment issue concerning
subpoenas for documents by circumscribing the act of production doc-
trine to the rather narrow area of subpoenas to individuals for personal
75. See id. at 109.
76. See id. at 110 ("[A] custodian's assumption of his representative capacity leads to cer-
tain obligations, including the duty to produce corporate records on proper demand by the Gov-
ernment. Under those circumstances, the custodian's act of production is not deemed a personal
act, but rather an act of the corporation."). One commentator argues that the use of the agency
theory creates a "dualistic" custodian by viewing Braswell as a corporate entity while the prosecu-
tors sought to convict him as an individual. See Grogan, supra note 34, at 726.
77. Braswell, 487 U.S. at 115 (footnote omitted). In his dissent, Justice Kennedy attacked
the reliance on the white collar rationale, arguing that "the text of the Fifth Amendment does not
authorize exceptions premised on such rationales." Id. at 129 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice
Kennedy further stated that "even if it were proper to invent such exceptions, the dangers
prophesied by the majority are overstated." Id.
78. Id. at 117-18.
79. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 616 ("We decline to extend the jurisdiction of
courts to include prospective grants of immunity in the absence of the formal request that the
statute requires.") (footnote omitted). The Braswell dissent argued that "[i]n Doe I we declined
expressly to do what the Court does today." Braswell, 487 U.S. at 128 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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records, and to sole proprietorships and small professional practices.
Although the decision brings a greater degree of doctrinal clarity to the
area, its result leads to arbitrary distinctions based once again on the
type of entity receiving the subpoena, an issue of only limited relevance
to the criminal investigation. The Court in Braswell limits the holding
of Doe to permitting the assertion of the act of production privilege
only to sole proprietorships; the collective entity doctrine requires that
the person producing the records act in a representative capacity, not
personally.
After Braswell, the production of the exact same types of records,
such as invoices or ledgers, depends on whether the owner of the enter-
prise chose to incorporate the business, or maintain a sole proprietor-
ship or small partnership arrangement. That decision can have momen-
tous consequences, because if the business is not incorporated, the
owner may be able to shield the records through the assertion of the
Fifth Amendment privilege. It is even possible under Braswell for a
person to own two businesses, one a corporation and the other a sole
proprietorship, and be able to assert the privilege to resist production of
one set of records yet be forced to produce the records for the other
business. It is odd that the seemingly inconsequential choice of what
organizational form to use for a business, which may have little if any
effect on its operations, can determine the applicability of a constitu-
tional right.
Nevertheless, Braswell adopts the more simple bright-line rule of
requiring all custodians of corporate records to produce the documents
without any resort to a claim of Fifth Amendment privilege. The
agency theory allows courts to ignore any concerns about the testimo-
nial aspect of the act of production by creating a type of immunity for
custodians that bars evidentiary use against the custodian as an indi-
vidual. The Braswell Court dispensed with the problem of reconciling
the Fifth Amendment protections with the need to prosecute economic
crimes by eliminating all possible Fifth Amendment claims for custodi-
ans that raised the white collar rationale to a level comparable to the
rights of the subpoenaed witness.8 0
The complex analysis proposed in Fisher has been replaced, for
most document subpoenas, by two narrow issues left open by Braswell:
(1) Is the document a corporate record? (2) Is the person challenging
80. One commentator notes that a possible explanation for the Court's approach to the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination in Braswell is its "unease with the [F]ifth [A]mendment itself
.... " Massing, supra note 67, at 1191.
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the subpoena a custodian? There may even be a way around the mini-
mal analysis required by Braswell, by resorting to another doctrine, the
required records exception, that bypasses the Fifth Amendment com-
pletely. The next section analyzes the development of the collective en-
tity doctrine after Braswell, and the effort by prosecutors to limit asser-
tions of the Fifth Amendment privilege to shield documents further.
4. Extending the Reach of Braswell
Witnesses subpoenaed to produce records before a grand jury have
only narrow grounds to challenge the subpoena as violative of their
Fifth Amendment rights after Braswell. Witnesses can argue that the
records are personal, rather than corporate records, and are therefore
protected under Boyd. The Supreme Court has paid homage to the
Boyd doctrine of protecting the privacy of personal papers, and the
lower courts differ as to whether Boyd remains good law.81 If the docu-
ments are determined to be corporate, however, the issue is whether the
witness qualifies as the custodian of the records. The trend since Bras-
well is to construe the terms "corporate records" and "custodian"
broadly, giving witnesses very little chance to escape the collective en-
tity rule. 2 The other approach to resist complying with the subpoena
focuses on the organizational form of the entity, trying to fit under the
Doe rule that records custodians of individual proprietorships can assert
the act of production privilege.8 3 The government may even try to over-
come that basis for the privilege by demonstrating that the subpoenaed
documents are "required records," and not subject to Fifth Amend-
ment protection. After Braswell, the courts have been receptive to ar-
guments that documents fall within the required records exception and
order the witness to produce the documents.8 "
a. What Are "Corporate Records"?
It is hard to imagine any court today refusing to require produc-
tion of the types of invoices at issue in Boyd. Permitting a corporation
to shield its normal paper flow relating to commercial transactions
would give it a virtual license to commit acts ranging from the highly
questionable to the clearly criminal. Secret accounts maintained in off-
81. See infra note 89.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 85-142.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
84. See infra text accompanying notes 143-51.
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shore banks designed to evade reporting requirements exemplify the
problem of allowing otherwise regular business activity to be com-
pletely protected from government investigation. While it is easy to as-
sail the decision in Boyd to protect documents relating to the normal
course of business, the harder question is how to determine what docu-
ments maintained by corporate officers and employees qualify as corpo-
rate records.
In In re Grand Jury Subpoenas,85 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit considered the status of records for the personal tele-
phone of a corporation's president and sole shareholder. The corpora-
tion paid the bills for several telephone lines listed under the president's
name in his homes and car. Although the bills were addressed to the
president personally, they came to the corporation's offices, were paid
with corporate funds, and the records were stored at the corporation.8
The government attempted unsuccessfully to subpoena the records
from the corporation, and then sought copies of the records maintained
by the president, who argued that they were personal documents.8 7
The court upheld the finding that the documents were corporate
records on the basis of the corporation's treatment of them: The com-
pany paid the bills; the president did not reimburse it for the expenses;
the company deducted the costs on its taxes; and the company main-
tained the records in its files. The president argued, however, that his
copies of the records were for his personal use. The court of appeals
held that
copies of corporate records do not become the personal property of an individual
merely because he has caused copies to be made ... Allowing a corporate officer
to obtain copies of corporate records and secure for them greater protection than
could be enjoyed for the originals would create a rule ripe for abuse.8
85. 959 F.2d 1158 (2d Cir. 1992).
86. Id. at 1161-62.
87. Id. The subpoena was addressed to the president's counsel as the custodian of records
for the corporation, a situation similar to that in Fisher. See id. at 1161. Counsel's control of the
documents is irrelevant to the Fifth Amendment analysis. See id. at 1163. The court, however,
stated,
Where... preexisting documents have been transferred to the attorney for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice and the client claims attorney-client privilege, the attorney may re-
fuse to produce the documents if the client, had he retained possession of them, would have
had a Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse production.
Id. (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 404-05 (1976)).
88. Id. at 1165. The court decided that, even if the documents were personal and not corpo-
rate, compelling their production would not violate the president's Fifth Amendment rights be-
cause they were not prepared by him and the act of production would not be incriminating. Id.
1993]
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
The court never mentioned Boyd, but the opinion exemplifies the
continuing power of the century-old holding that the government can-
not compel production of "private" papers because the court continued
to focus on whether the documents were personal or corporate.8 Bras-
well leaves open the question of whether any writing prepared prior to
the criminal investigation (specifically, documents that are not in them-
selves compelled confessions) can be reached by the government. The
issue of whether a document is "corporate" or "personal" requires an
assessment of whether the content and purpose of the document relates
to business activity or an individual's private affairs. Needless to say,
making those distinctions requires much hair-splitting by courts.
Courts describe the prospect of government seizures of private dia-
ries and letters as clearly violative of the Fifth Amendment privilege. 90
The likelihood, however, that investigators would have the slightest in-
terest in such documents in a white collar case is minimal. Even if such
documents exist and contain inculpatory admissions, the government is
more likely to seize them pursuant to a search warrant than to send a
subpoena demanding that the author produce them, simply because
most people will not voluntarily surrender incriminating evidence.91
The government's subpoena was so carefully drafted to reach specific telephone numbers that the
court's Fisher analysis was correct, although the court probably should have explicitly applied the
foregone conclusion analysis. The case illustrates that Braswell has relegated Fisher's act of pro-
duction analysis to a secondary position that courts may address in dicta.
89. Prior to Braswell, in United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984), Justice O'Connor
stated in a concurrence that "the Fifth Amendment provides absolutely no protection for the
contents of private papers of any kind," and argued that Fisher "sounded the death knell for
Boyd." Id. at 618 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Braswell, however, did not specifically overrule
Boyd, and its analysis of the collective entity doctrine as a means to avoid the breadth of Boyd
supports the conclusion that the protection for "private papers" (however narrowly that term
might be defined) remains viable. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S 99, 105 (1988) ("Hale
carved an exception out of Boyd .... "); see also United States v. Freidus, 135 F.R.D. 52, 59
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that Boyd remains good law despite Fisher); In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena Duces Tecum, 741 F. Supp. 1059, 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that the Boyd holding
should be preserved because "a mechanical application of the Fisher-Doe analysis to bar the invo-
cation of the Fifth Amendment for private papers is inappropriate."). The Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit, however, implied that Boyd is no longer good law when it stated that "[elven for
records of an individual, the privilege applies in only a limited fashion. It does not cover the
contents of any voluntarily prepared records, including personal ones." In re Sealed Case, 877
F.2d 83, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990); see also In re Grand Jury 89-4
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 727 F. Supp. 265, 268 n.4 (E.D. Va. 1989) (stating that Boyd "is no
longer authoritative."). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit refused to decide whether
Boyd had any "remaining vitality," reserving the question for another day. See In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 921 F.2d 1184, 1187 n.6 (11th Cir. 1991).
90. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 414 (1976).
91. See Alito, supra note 64, at 47 ("Where possession cannot be independently shown,
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The possibility that one can be forced to incriminate oneself by deliver-
ing intimate personal papers is a convenient illustration for courts to
cite, but otherwise is not realistic in the context of white collar
investigations.
The subpoenas for documents that typically raise the issue of per-
sonal versus corporate records involve the pocket diaries and calendars
of corporate officers and employees. These items will frequently include
both business and personal entries, and can be crucial evidence in eco-
nomic crimes to show the timing and content of business meetings. In
United States v. Wujkowski,92 the government subpoenaed, among
other things, the pocket calendars and planner schedules of two execu-
tives as part of an investigation of corruption of public officials and
contractors. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the
government's argument that a corporate employee's appointment books
and schedules are presumptively business records and instead listed a
series of factors a court must consider in determining whether the
items are corporate or personal. 93 The court also considered certain
records pertaining to a beach house owned by one of the executives,
holding that the documents could be transformed from personal to cor-
porate records if there was a financial link between the use of the beach
house and the corporation.94 The court of appeals focused not on the
content of the documents, but rather on the relationship of the person
to the underlying business activity being investigated.
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in In re Sealed Case95
explicitly adopted an agency analysis" to determine whether documents
constitute corporate records. The witness made an intriguing argument
that falsified corporate documents used to create an unauthorized bank
account in the corporation's name, but controlled by the witness, could
not be corporate records but instead were personal records. The court
rejected that position, holding that there was an agency relationship
between the witness, who was an employee of the company, and the
common sense and experience suggest that incriminating evidence frequently will not be
produced.").
92. 929 F.2d 981 (4th Cir. 1991).
93. Id. at 984. The factors are "who prepared the document, the nature of its contents, its
purpose or use, who maintained possession and who had access to it, whether the corporation
required its preparation, and whether its existence was necessary to or in furtherance of the con-
duct of the corporation's business." Id.
94. Id. at 985. The court also noted that "[elvidence of corporate hospitality or of the con-
duct of corporate business at the dwelling would also be relevant." Id.
95. 877 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990).
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corporation; the fact that documents were used to defraud the corpora-
tion did not change their status as records of the corporation and there-
fore they were not subject to any Fifth Amendment privilege.96
Whether the documents are used for personal purposes does not control
the determination of whether they are corporate. Rather, the issue is
whether a business relationship exists between the person claiming the
privilege and the entity subpoenaed. If there is some evidence of that
link, the courts will usually determine that the documents are business
records and subject to production without any Fifth Amendment pro-
tection under Braswell.97
While a personal document can become a corporate record, courts
have not addressed whether a document can ever change its status from
a corporate to a personal record subject to a Fifth Amendment privi-
lege claim. In In re Grand Jury Subpoenas,98 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit concluded the telephone bills held by the corpora-
tion were corporate records. The court then, however, leapt to the con-
clusion that copies of those records that are held by an individual away
from the corporation remain ipso facto corporate records.99 In effect,
the court held that once a document is designated a corporate record, it
retains that status regardless of how the item is subsequently handled.
Although it is hard to dispute that mere photocopying of a document
cannot automatically change its status, the court did not consider how
the witness handled the document or the purpose of maintaining a copy
outside of the corporate office.
Boyd's vestige after Braswell is to hold out the faint hope that a
witness can demonstrate that the subpoenaed documents are personal,
and therefore protected by the Fifth Amendment. The approach
96. Id. at 88-89. The court stated, "Apart from appellant's alleged use of the account for
larceny or for other illegal purposes, the records are corporate. The account is in the corporation's
name, is run by the corporation's president and chief executive officer, and is funded with corpo-
rate property." Id. at 89; see also In re Trader Roe, 720 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding
that a subpoena for a commodities trader's records, which showed transactions under investigation
and which would likely show illegal trades, must be produced).
97. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 950 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (requiring an in camera
review of records held by a witness in connection with federal employment); In re Steinberg, 837
F.2d 527 (lst Cir. 1988) (enforcing a subpoena for notebooks related to security operations of a
political organization); In re Grand Jury 89-4 Subpoena Duces Tecum, 727 F. Supp. 265, 269
(E.D. Va. 1989) (enforcing a subpoena for documents of a defunct corporation and finding that
changes in corporate form do "not miraculously operate to metamorphose the corporation's docu-
ments into personal documents."); In re Trader Roe, 720 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. III. 1989) (ordering
production of trading cards and other records maintained by commodities trader).
98. 959 F.2d 1158, 1163 (2d Cir. 1992).
99. Id. at 1165.
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adopted by the courts is to give a broad meaning to the term "corpo-
rate records," and to compel the witness to turn over the documents for
an in camera review to determine whether there is any business aspect
to the documents. 100 To the extent that the documents contain incrimi-
nating information related to an investigation of economic crimes, the
court is likely to err on the side of finding that the records are corpo-
rate; the more innocuous the item, the more likely it will be considered
personal. Although Braswell did not overrule Boyd, the courts have
made it virtually impossible to find the contents of any documents pro-
tected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
b. Who Is a "Custodian"?
By only prohibiting the prosecution from using the corporate act of
production privilege against the individual producing the documents,
Braswell gives the custodian of corporate records cold comfort because
the jury may still draw an inference that the defendant was the person
who produced the records. 101 If the witness can avoid the label of custo-
dian, the subpoena will have to be reissued to the person in an individ-
ual capacity; this would permit invocation of the act of production priv-
ilege to protect the documents, or designation of a different custodian
who will produce the records on behalf of the entity. When the govern-
ment merely seeks the records themselves and has little interest in who
actually produces them, which is usually the case, the designation as a
custodian is immaterial.0 2
When the prosecutor, however, is interested in discovering the doc-
uments that a particular witness possesses, especially where the person
is a target of the investigation, the label of custodian has important
100. See, e.g., Sealed Case, 950 F.2d at 738-39 (holding that the district court must review
every document despite large volume of records to determine whether witness can assert privi-
lege); United States v. Wujkowski, 929 F.2d 981 (4th Cir. 1991) (requiring in camera review of
pocket calendars and planner schedules to determine whether they are related to corporate trans-
actions); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 741 F. Supp. 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (ordering
in camera review of daily diaries, appointment books, and address books to determine whether the
documents are personal or corporate), afd without published op., 956 F.2d 1160 (2d Cir. 1992).
101. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 118 (1988) ("[I]f the defendant held a
prominent position within the corporation that produced the records, the jury may, just as it would
had someone else produced the documents, reasonably infer that he had possession of the docu-
ments or knowledge of their contents."); see also Marvin G. Pickholz & Paul N. Murphy, Corpo-
rate Officers and Employees After Braswell: Is No Document Sacred?, 18 SEc. REG. L.J. 359, 367
(1991) (asserting that Braswell leaves corporate custodians with scant protection).
102. In that instance, the witness will rarely be called before the grand jury and instead will
supply the documents directly to the prosecutor or investigative agency.
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implications for building a criminal case against the individual. The
possession or control of the documents, and the implicit meaning that
can be inferred from a person's choice to maintain specific records, can
be crucial evidence for determining both the person's culpability and
the likely scope of the investigation.
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Paul),'0 3 the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit considered a challenge to a grand jury subpoena
seeking bank records copied and maintained by the financial institu-
tion's former chief executive officer, David A. Paul.10 Paul argued that
although the documents were corporate records, he was not a custodian
of the records because he was no longer employed by the bank. The
court rejected that position, holding that a custodian possesses the doc-
uments in a representative capacity even after leaving the business en-
tity, and "[i]t is the immutable character of the records as corporate
which requires their production and which dictates that they are held
in a representative capacity." 05 .
Paul is an interesting case more for what is taking place below the
surface than for the court's holding, which is otherwise straightforward
and unremarkable. First, Paul was incarcerated for contempt, which is
rare in cases challenging grand jury subpoenas. Because a contempt
citation is a prerequisite to appellate review, 0 6 courts generally allow
the contemnor to remain free while pursuing the appeal. If jail were a
real possibility, fewer witnesses, or counsel, would take the steps neces-
sary to litigate the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Second, the
reason why the government subpoenaed Paul is unclear. If Paul had
taken the only copies of the bank's records, then it was a very easy case
because Paul was the only possible custodian of the corporation's
records. If, however, the prosecutor already had the records, or access
to them, then the subpoena to Paul was probably designed to learn
what records he considered important enough to copy and remove from
the bank. The latter reason means that while the subpoena is ostensibly
for corporate documents, the pertinent information is the witness'
103. 957 F.2d 807 (11th Cir. 1992).
104. Id. at 808.
105. Id. at 812. Paul also argued that he was holding the documents for "personal reasons"
and therefore could assert the Fifth Amendment to bar production. The court rejected that posi-
tion as "specious" in light of Braswell. Id.
106. See United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971) (stating that immediate appeala-
bility of contempt citation allows for appellate review of grand jury subpoena); Cobbledick v.
United States, 309 U.S. 323, 328 (1940) (holding that the denial of a motion to quash a grand
jury subpoena is not an appealable final order).
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thought process in selecting certain items.107 If the chief executive of-
ficer considers some transactions important enough to have the relevant
documents copied to assist in defending himself, then those are proba-
bly the transactions that a prosecutor would be most interested in, too.
Requiring Paul to produce the records as the custodian of the corpora-
tion means that he may supply the government with a roadmap to sus-
picious transactions. The Eleventh Circuit's holding in Paul focuses on
the "immutable character" of the documents, and it is that determina-
tion that overrides any underlying 'question of whether the witness's
production may also be testimonial and incriminating, further high-
lighting Braswell's limitation on the Fisher act of production
analysis. 108
The analysis of what constitutes a corporate record is formalistic,
looking at the attributes of the document and its relationship to the
business activity at issue. The determination of who may be a custodian
rejects any formalism, and courts will not confine the designation of a
custodian to the person selected by the entity subpoenaed. In In re
Sealed Case,0 9 the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit rejected a
witness's claim that he need not produce the documents himself be-
cause the corporation designated another person as the custodian. The
court held that an entity can have more than one person represent it,
citing the white collar rationale that any other rule could permit a cor-
porate officer to designate a custodian with no knowledge of the exis-
tence or location of documents necessary to prosecute economic
crimes. 1" 0 Therefore, according to the court, any person who is an
agent of the corporation has custody or control of the corporate docu-
107. Possession of the documents may in itself be illegal, and therefore the subpoena seeks
an admission of culpability through production of the records. In In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum (Saxon Indus.), 722 F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1983), the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that once an officer leaves a corporation's employment, she no longer acts as a corpo-
rate representative but only in a personal capacity with regard to corporate documents. Id. at 986-
87. In Saxon, the documents sought were duplicates of records already obtained by the govern-
ment, and the court was apparently troubled by the government's need for the documents when
possession of them might be wrongful. No other court has followed Saxon's holding that a former
officer does not hold the documents in a representative capacity, and Braswell probably overrules
the approach of Saxon that allowed the witness to assert an act of production privilege because
the documents at issue are admittedly corporate and not personal. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena
(Paul), 957 F.2d 807, 811 (1lth Cir. 1992).
108. See Paul, 957 F.2d at 811. After the government subpoenaed the records, Paul was
indicted for various alleged crimes relating to his activities at the financial institution. Id. at 809
n.2.
109. 877 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990).
110. Id. at 86.
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ments. Correspondingly, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida held that "any person with custody over
corporate records is a records custodian."""1 The fact of access or con-
trol of documents, or an agency relationship, determines whether one
can be a corporate records custodian, regardless of the continuing exis-
tence of the corporation, or one's current association with the entity.
The one instance in which a witness will argue in favor of being
designated a custodian is when the business organization is a sole pro-
prietorship or similarly small partnership such that the act of produc-
tion doctrine can be asserted under the holding in Doe. A subpoena to
the owner or partner of such an entity as the custodian of records is
considered to compel testimony from the person in an individual capac-
ity, not as the representative of a collective entity as defined by Bellis,
and is therefore subject to a Fifth Amendment claim. For certain types
of organizations that exhibit qualities of both sole proprietorships and
corporations, the government can avoid the Doe limitation by arguing
that the entity meets the requirements of Bellis to qualify as a collec-
tive entity.1"2 Even if it is not a collective entity, the owner or partner
need not be subpoenaed personally, and someone else, such as an em-
ployee, can qualify as the custodian. The owner or partner will argue,
however, that they retained "constructive possession" of the documents
and they are the only proper custodian of the records."'
In In re Grand Jury Investigation,"4 the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit reviewed a subpoena for financial records to the secre-
tary of a lawyer who operated his practice as a sole proprietorship.' 15
The court found that the secretary "was intimately involved in the
preparation and maintenance of the records," and therefore was a valid
substitute custodian.118 Similarly, in Doe v. United States,17 the Court
I 11. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 742 F. Supp. 1154, 1155-56 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (citing In
re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990)).
112. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 973 F.2d 45, 50 (Ist Cir. 1992) (holding that Massa-
chusetts nominee trusts are collective entities because they possess a formal status, trustees are
authorized to act on behalf of the trust, and trusts are "held out to the world as being separate
and apart from beneficiaries").
113. In United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757, 763 (5th Cir.), aft'd on reh'g en banc, 487
F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit stated that a person may retain the Fifth Amendment privilege when the documents are
placed with another person or entity "for custodial safekeeping" only.
114. 921 F.2d 1184 (11th Cir. 1991).
115. Id. at 1184-85.
116. Id. at 1189.
117. 834 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1987).
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of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed a subpoena to the adminis-
trative assistant to a married couple for their personal financial records
in connection with an investigation of diversion of corporate funds and
tax evasion.11 The court focused on "the degree of control ceded to the
party the subpoena compels to act rather than the degree of control
retained by the owner." ' The administrative assistant had "virtually
exclusive responsibility" for the records, while the couple had only min-
imal contact with them, and the assistant was therefore qualified to
produce the documents as a custodian. 120
Neither the Eleventh Circuit nor the Second Circuit allowed the
form of the entity or the personal status of the documents to inhibit the
analysis of the relationship between the person subpoenaed and the
records sought. In much the same way that a corporation's designation
of a custodian is not binding on whether an agent or former employee
may be compelled to produce records,1 21 the intent of the owner of the
records was irrelevant to the determination of whether a third-party
could qualify as the custodian.
Once one is designated a custodian of records, the issue then arises
as to what duties the custodian has. As an initial matter, the entity,
through its custodian, must provide the documents to the grand jury or
administrative agency that subpoenaed the records. Frequently that
will be all that is required at that point because neither the grand jury
nor administrative investigations are bound by the rules of evidence
concerning hearsay.1 22 The custodian may, however, be called at trial
118. Id. at 1129-30.
119. Id. at 1133. The case was decided a few months before Braswell, and therefore the
court of appeals was primarily concerned with the act of production issue. After Braswell, the
court would have been able to find that the documents were corporate records because (1) the
administrative assistant was an employee of the corporation; (2) the files were maintained in the
assistant's office in the corporate suite; and (3) he created and maintained the records within the
scope of his employment. Moreover, the documents may have reflected corporate transactions,
albeit illegal ones, that may have made at least part of the records corporate rather than personal.
120. Id.
121. The only decision to uphold a claim of constructive possession is In re Grand Jury
Subpoena (Kent), 646 F.2d 963, 970 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981), when the court found that the
owner "never delivered possession, custody, or control of his records" to the employee subpoenaed
as custodian. Id. at 970 (emphasis added). Kent supports the proposition that it is the relationship
of the purported custodian to the subpoenaed records and not the intent of the owner or partner
that controls the determination of who can qualify as a custodian.
122. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1988) (providing that, in ad-
ministrative agency hearings, "[a/ny oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the
agency as a matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly
repetitious evidence" (emphasis added)); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363-64 (uphold-
ing validity of indictment even though only hearsay evidence was presented to grand jury); United
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to testify as to the authenticity of the documents provided. The ques-
tion then arises as to how much questioning the custodian must respond
to before a valid assertion of the Fifth Amendment can be made.
In Curcio v. United States,12 3 the witness, a local labor union's
secretary-treasurer, refused to answer questions before a grand jury
concerning the location or possession of the local's books and records
and was found guilty of criminal contempt. 2 Although the Supreme
Court found that the rightful custodian of the union's records could not
refuse to produce them, "he cannot lawfully be compelled, in the ab-
sence of a grant of immunity from prosecution, to condemn himself by
his own oral testimony."' 25 The Court held that there is a distinction
for determining the applicability of the Fifth Amendment between re-
quiring the corporate custodian to produce records, and compelling an-
swers to questions about the location or possession of the documents."2 6
In Braswell, the Court read Curcio narrowly, finding that Curcio
barred the custodian's oral testimony, but not the incriminating testi-
mony that was part of the act of production. 21
In In re Custodian of Records of Variety Distributing, Inc.,28 the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit took Braswell one step further
by holding that a corporate custodian can be required to provide oral
testimony about the creation and maintenance of the documents to es-
tablish the foundation for admission of the documents under the busi-
ness records exception to the hearsay rule. 2 " The underlying criminal
States v. Maceo, 873 F.2d 1, 3 (lst Cir.) (concluding that the validity of the indictment is not
affected by insufficiency of evidence presented to grand jury), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 840 (1989).
123. 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
124. Id. at 119-21.
125. Id. at 124.
126. Id. at 127-28. The Court rejected the government's argument that the white collar
rationale supports requiring the custodian to provide oral testimony, stating that to allow such
questioning "requires him to disclose the contents of his own mind. . . .That is contrary to the
spirit and letter of the Fifth Amendment." Id.
127. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 114 (1988). In Braswell, the Court stated:
The Curcio Court made clear that with respect to a custodian of a collective entity's
records, the line drawn was between oral testimony and other forms of incrimination....
In distinguishing those cases in which a corporate officer was required to produce corporate
records and merely identify them by oral testimony, the Court showed that it understood
the testimonial nature of the act of production ....
Id. In Curcio, the Court noted that "[r]equiring the custodian to identify or authenticate the
documents for admission in evidence merely makes explicit what is implicit in the production
itself." Curcio, 354 U.S. at 125.
128. 927 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1991).
129. See id. at 245; see also FED. R. EvID. 803(6) (setting forth the business records excep-
tion to the hearsay rule). Rule 803(6) states that the hearsay rule does not exclude the following
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case involved the prosecution of a theater and its owners for selling
obscene videos. The prosecution subpoenaed the records of two corpora-
tions that allegedly supplied the videos for trial showing the interstate
shipment of the items to the defendants. The records custodian of one
corporation provided the documents but invoked his privilege and re-
fused to testify that they were records of the corporation maintained in
the normal course of business, which was necessary to establish the
business records exception for the admission of the documents into
evidence.130
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected the custo-
dian's Fifth Amendment claim, holding that Braswell's narrow reading
of Curcio eliminates a custodian's privilege to refuse to testify as to
matters "auxiliary" to producing corporate records because the testi-
mony "is different from the type of explicitly incriminating oral testi-
mony sought [in Curcio].""' The court found that the collective entity
analysis in Braswell requires the custodian "to identify and authenti-
cate the documents produced for admission into evidence.' 1 32 The only
additional testimony required of the corporate custodian was to provide
the information necessary to permit admission into evidence of the bus-
iness records. Concurrent with Braswell, the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that the government could not use the custodian's
testimony about the business records against him personally in a subse-
quent prosecution. 33
Variety Distributing's analysis of the scope of oral testimony a
custodian can be compelled to provide without infringing upon the
Fifth Amendment rights of the custodian is flawed, because the court
of appeals failed to distinguish between authentication of documents
and establishing admissibility under the business records exception.
The court treats them as being related parts of a custodian's testimony,
documents:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, condi-
tions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted
by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activ-
ity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum,
report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other
qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of prepa-
ration indicate lack of trustworthiness.
Id.
130. Variety Distrib., 927 F.2d at 247-48.
131. Id. at 248.
132. Id. at 249.
133. Id. at 250-51.
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stating that the "authentication" required of the witness is to testify
"that shipping videos is a regular business activity and the corporation
regularly keeps records of its shipments."'134 Authentication and the
business records exception, however, address distinct evidentiary issues
and are treated by the Federal Rules of Evidence separately. Federal
Rule of Evidence 901(a) states that "authentication ... as a condition
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims."' 35
The authenticity of evidence is generally not presumed, except for cer-
tain items, and the party offering the item must provide some evidence,
either direct or circumstantial, that the item is what it purports to be.
Once the court determines there is sufficient evidence of authenticity,
then the item may be admitted into evidence and it is up to the jury to
decide any remaining question concerning authenticity. 36
The hearsay rule is designed to exclude otherwise relevant evi-
dence that does not meet the basic requirements of the adversary sys-
tem that testimony be made under oath, at trial, and subject to cross-
examination. 31 Although business records are clearly hearsay, they are
admissible if there is sufficient testimony to show their reliability, based
on the fact that regularly maintained records have a high degree of
accuracy.3 8 The testimony required for authentication of business
records relates to the location of the records and their correspondence
to the specifications of the subpoena. The business records exception,
on the other hand, concerns the conduct of the enterprise at the time
the record was created or transcribed . 3 The foundation for admission
as an exception to the hearsay rule requires the witness to have per-
sonal knowledge of the type of business conducted and its routine
practices. 4 '
A document may be authentic even though it does not meet the
business records exception. Variety Distributing, however, ignores that
distinction. Instead, the court in Variety Distributing expands the scope
134. Id. at 251.
135. FED. R. EvID. 901(a).
136. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED. EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 35 (2d ed. 1989) (stating
that the test is whether there is sufficient evidence to support a rational jury finding that the item
is genuine or accurate, and that the court looks only to the proponent's evidence).
137. See 2 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL.. McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 245, at 93-96 (John
W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
138. Id. § 286.
139. See FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
140. See id.
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of Braswell to include testimony that will permit the admission of sub-
poenaed documents as substantive evidence. That testimony may be
crucial to implicating the witness in criminal activity by the organiza-
tion, which conflicts with Curcio's prohibition against using oral testi-
mony against the custodian."' Moreover, as the court noted but did not
decide, the witness may try to assert the Fifth Amendment on cross-
examination.14 That would require resolution of the confrontation
clause problem and the scope of the privilege, if the questioning went
into any detail concerning the witness's foundation testimony.
c. The Required Records Exception: Avoiding the Limitations of
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Variety Distributing demonstrates the degree to which a court will
go to ensure the admission of corporate records. The designation as
custodian can permit the prosecution to use a target of the investigation
as the vehicle to obtain important records and provide the necessary
foundation to secure the admission of the documents as evidence. The
scope of the Fifth Amendment, however, is subject to even further limi-
tation if the documents meet the "required records" exception, which
overcomes any assertion of the Fifth Amendment by the person in pos-
session of the documents.
The exception "overrides the privilege against self-incrimination in
situations in which the privilege would otherwise apply" even if the act
of production is incriminating. 43 The prosecution may obtain any doc-
ument, regardless of whether it is "personal," or the business entity is a
sole proprietorship or small partnership, if the following three condi-
tions can be shown to establish the required records exception: (1) the
141. For example, substantial criminal penalties can be imposed against persons engaging in
continuing criminal enterprises. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1988). Federal law defines "continuing
criminal enterprises" as operations that involve certain illegal drug transactions with more than
five persons acting in concert and from which the defendant obtains a substantial income. See id.
§ 848(c). The testimony related to establishing the business records exception can also encompass
the size of the business and its method of disbursing proceeds, which is evidence that can also
prove a continuing criminal enterprise. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit indicated that
the Braswell limitation on using the testimony against the custodian in an individual capacity
applies to the testimony on the business records exception. See In re Custodian of Records of
Variety Distrib., 927 F.2d 244, 251 (6th Cir. 1991). The mere admission of the documents, how-
ever, may establish the criminal violation through evidence that may not have otherwise been
admissible. Stating that the testimony cannot be used does not eliminate the problem that the
evidence before the jury is introduced through the custodian's oral testimony.
142. Variety Distrib., 927 F.2d at 250 n.5.
143. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 793 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir. 1986).
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statutory scheme is essentially regulatory and not criminal; (2) the re-
cordkeeping requirements apply to records a business normally main-
tains; and (3) the records themselves have a "public aspect" making
them analogous to public documents.144 The limited vitality of Fisher
and Doe is further undermined by the required records exception be-
cause the doctrine is premised on the need to allow the government to
reach records that are incriminating and whose production will be used
against the person maintaining them individually. 45
The third prong of the required records exception is the hardest
part to apply because the Supreme Court has never defined what the
"public aspect" is that allows the documents to be transformed from
records potentially protected by the Fifth Amendment to completely
available to the government for use against their creator or custodian.
In United States v. Lehman,46 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit examined the relationship between the party creating the rec-
ord and the administrative agency regulating the business to determine
whether the government had a strong enough interest in the mainte-
nance of the records to demonstrate the need for regular public access
to the documents.,47 The court ordered the production of certain finan-
cial records because of important health and safety interests and be-
cause the proprietor could not show that the documents were "inher-
ently private."' 4
It is not entirely clear why courts have continued to apply the re-
quired records exception in light of Braswell's broad holding requiring
production of corporate records. The rationale for the doctrine is that
those who choose to conduct business subject to the government's regu-
latory scheme effectively waive their Fifth Amendment privilege, and
144. Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 68 (1968); see also Shapiro v. United States,
335 U.S. 1, 32-35 (1948) (holding that records, which are required by law to be kept, have "pub-
lic aspects" and may be used as evidence when lawfully obtained by subpoena).
145. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 781 F.2d 64 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 813 (1986). "Supreme Court has directed that where the narrow parameters of the
doctrine are met, and the balance weighs in favor of disclosure, the information must be forthcom-
ing even in the face of potential incrimination." Id. at 70.
146. 887 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. 1989).
147. Id. at 1333. The court noted that the third prong "does not lend itself to analytical
precision . I..." d. The problematic aspect of the third prong is that the government's desire for
the information cannot alone render the information public. See Grosso, 390 U.S. at 68 (explain-
ing that, although the information is desired, "this alone does not render information 'public,' and
thus does not deprive it of constitutional protection"); see also Marchetti v. United States, 390
U.S. 39, 57 (1968) (stating that the Fifth Amendment is not overridden because the government
has "formalized its demands in the attire of a statute").
148. Lehman, 887 F.2d at 1333.
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because of the public aspect of the records that businesses would other-
wise maintain, there is only a slight risk of incrimination in producing
the document. 49 The weakness of this approach is that it adopts the
basic Fisher act of production analysis to support an exception to even
allowing an assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination. More-
over, it assumes that business owners have chosen to waive their consti-
tutional rights without any clear warning that they have done so, and
uses a three-part test with at least one factor whose application is
vague, at best.
In some instances, the documents sought by subpoenas for re-
quired records may otherwise qualify as corporate records under Bras-
well. 50 The value to prosecutors of the required records exception is
that it avoids both the Doe stricture on compelling production of docu-
ments from sole proprietorships and small partnerships, and the Bras-
well constraint on using the custodian's testimony against the person in
an individual capacity.'' By preventing any assertion of the Fifth
Amendment privilege, the required records doctrine gives prosecutors a
potentially powerful argument to compel the production of documents
without any real constraint on the use of the documents and related
testimony by the custodian. In conjunction with Variety Distributing,
the custodian of the required records may be required to testify con-
cerning the relevant course of business to enable the documents to be
admitted under the business records exception. There would not be any
limitation on the use of that testimony against the custodian in an indi-
vidual capacity because there is no privilege with regard to required
records and the exception does not implicate the Braswell limitation on
the use of a custodian's testimony.
149. See Subpoena Duces Tecurn, 781 F.2d at 70.
150. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 772 F. Supp. 326 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (upholding
subpoena to former employees for records taken from savings and loan institution); In re FDIC,
640 F. Supp. 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (upholding subpoena to former bank employee for records
taken from institution). In In re FDIC, decided before Braswell, the administrative subpoena du-
ces tecum was addressed to the former officer in her personal capacity. Id. at 1179. The law is
now settled that the subpoena should be addressed to the individual as the custodian because the
witness's current employment status is immaterial to determining whether the documents must be
produced.
151. See United States v. Lehman, 887 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. 1989) (allowing an administra-
tive subpoena to a livestock dealer who was apparently operating a sole proprietorship); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 801 F.2d 1164 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (upholding a subpoena for
drug prescription records of medical practice operated by one doctor); In re Two Grand Jury
Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 793 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1986) (upholding two subpoenas for law firm
records); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 781 F.2d 64 (6th Cir. 1986) (allowing sub-
poena to sole proprietorships for automobile odometer records).
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B. The Scope of Immunity Under Kastigar and Braswell for Wit-
nesses and Custodians
The primary effect of Braswell on white collar criminal investiga-
tions is to limit the ability of witnesses to shield documents from the
purview of the grand jury or an investigative agency through the asser-
tion of the right against self-incrimination. Although the courts have
made the application of the law clearer, ambiguity remains in deter-
mining how Braswell's limitation on the use of the act of production
privilege by the custodian should be reconciled with the more tradi-
tional analysis of the scope of immunity under the Fifth Amendment.
The Supreme Court in Doe asserted that the judiciary has no right to
impose immunity on a witness without a request for it from the prose-
cutor, and Braswell rejected the argument that the limitation on evi-
dentiary use was the equivalent of a constructive use immunity. While
the Court in Braswell vigorously shunned the label "immunity," it left
open the question of what use can be made of the act of production. 15 2
It would be incongruous to give more protection to the Braswell prohi-
bition against evidentiary use, which is a "necessary concomitant" to
the collective entity doctrine but not a constitutional prerequisite, than
to a grant of immunity that reaches the limits of the Fifth Amend-
ment's protection against self-incrimination. The question, therefore, is
to determine how Braswell's protection fits into the hierarchy of poten-
tial uses of immunized statements by defendants created in Kastigar v.
United States.153
In Kastigar, the Supreme Court upheld a statute granting use im-
munity as coextensive with the protections of the Fifth Amendment
privilege, rather than requiring the government to grant complete
transactional immunity. In describing the outlines of the protection for
immunized statements, the Court stated that use immunity "prohibits
the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled testimony in any
respect, and it therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead to the
infliction of criminal penalties on the witness."11 54 Use immunity does
not bar a subsequent prosecution of the witness, but the government
152. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 118 n.11 (1988).
153. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
154. Id. at 453. The immunity statute provides that "no testimony or other information
compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony
or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order." 18 U.S.C. §
6002 (1988).
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bears a "heavy burden of proving that all of the evidence it proposes to
use was derived from legitimate independent sources.' 55 The Kastigar
hearing requires that the government prove that its evidence is not
tainted by the defendant's prior immunized statements, and therefore a
grant of immunity can, as the Court noted in Braswell, entail signifi-
cant drawbacks in the attempt to prosecute the immunized witness.156
Kastigar bars any direct or indirect evidentiary use of the immu-
nized testimony against the defendant at trial. At the pre-indictment
stage of white collar investigations where the prosecutor seeks produc-
tion of documents, the issue can arise whether to grant act of produc-
tion immunity to a custodian who can avoid the limitations on the as-
sertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege imposed by Braswell and its
progeny. The question for the government is whether the limited grant
of use immunity for production of records will taint the documents
such that a subsequent prosecution of the custodian will be prohibited
by Kastigar. That issue cannot be resolved at the investigative stage
because the only time a witness can challenge the scope of the immu-
nity and the potential use of tainted evidence is at a suppression hear-
ing after indictment . 5  To the extent that witnesses are granted immu-
nity to produce documents at an early stage of the investigation, the
prosecution runs a substantial risk that it will have to forego using im-
portant evidence related to the act of production to prove criminal
charges against the custodian.158
The effect of finding a violation of the defendant's Fifth Amend-
ment privilege through improper use of the immunized testimony is dis-
missal of the indictment. Kastigar violations typically involve indirect
use of the immunized statements as an investigative tool, using the so-
called "fruits" of the compelled statements against the witness through
the introduction of tainted evidence. In United States v. Hampton,159
the federal government sought to prosecute a witness who had testified
155. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461-62.
156. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 117 (1988).
157. See In re J.W.O., 940 F.2d 1165, 1167-68 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that the appropri-
ate time and place for challenging use of tainted evidence is after the witness has been indicted);
In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 890 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that danger of improperly
using immunized testimony is only after witness is indicted, which may then be challenged at
suppression hearing); In re Sealed Case, 791 F.2d 179, 182 (D.C. Cir.) (stating that the scope of
immunity is a question for a subsequent suppression hearing), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 924 (1986).
158. The government must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that all of its
evidence is based on an independent source and not on the immunized testimony. United States v.
Seiffert, 501 F.2d 974, 982 (5th Cir. 1974).
159. 775 F.2d 1479 (11th Cir. 1985).
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before a state grand jury. State law provided transactional immunity to
grand jury witnesses, and the state investigators extensively briefed fed-
eral agents before their investigation. The Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit "disabused" the government of the "faulty notion"
that it could meet its Kastigar burden through proof of an independent
source of some of its evidence and conclusory denials that it used the
fruits of the immunized statement "to fill in the numerous evidentiary
holes that remain."16 In United States v. Tormos-Vega, 1e a defendant
gave widely viewed testimony under a grant of immunity before a legis-
lative committee and was indicted on charges relating to specific trans-
actions about which he had testified. The investigative agent immersed
himself in the testimony, which led the district court to state that it
"cannot give serious consideration to the government's contention that
its agent did not use the important information revealed by Serrano's
testimony in the manner prohibited by Kastigar.11 2 The Justice De-
partment has sought to minimize the possibility of violating an immu-
nized witness's rights by requiring express approval of prosecutions of
witnesses based on information first disclosed in, or closely related to,
their immunized statements.1 6 3
160. Id. at 1489. The government used the immunized information to build a case against a
co-conspirator, who agreed to plead guilty and to testify against the immunized witness. The court
of appeals held that "the testimony of the co-conspirator must be deemed to have been indirectly
derived from the testimony of the immunized witness in violation of Kastigar." Id. at 1488.
161. 656 F. Supp. 1525 (D.P.R. 1987), affd without op., 843 F.2d 1384 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 848 (1988).
162. Id. at 1534. The court also noted that the agent brought the immunized testimony to
the attention of the grand jury. Id. at 1535. The courts are split as to whether the grand jury
hearing the immunized testimony may properly indict the witness for crimes related to the subject
of the testimony. Compare United States v. Garrett, 797 F.2d 656, 663-65 (8th Cir. 1986) (hold-
ing that indictment by same grand jury that hears immunized testimony is not an automatic Fifth
Amendment violation, but requiring an evidentiary hearing to determine whether indictment rests
directly or indirectly on the immunized testimony) and United States v. Zielezinski, 740 F.2d 727
(9th Cir. 1984) (same) with United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir.) (mandating auto-
matic dismissal if same grand jury hearing the immunized testimony indicts witness), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 980 (1976).
In United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir.), modified per curiam, 920 F.2d 940
(D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2235 (1991), a similar though more notorious case than
Tormos-Vega, the court of appeals vacated the conviction of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North
because of the effect his widely viewed congressional testimony may have had on the testimony of
other witnesses. North and Tormos-Vega may stand for the proposition that witnesses testifying
under legislative grants of immunity cannot be prosecuted when, as is usually the case, their state-
ments are widely publicized in the press.
163. DEP'T OF JUSTICE. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-23.400 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter U.S. ATT'Ys MANUAL]. Among other things, Justice Department approval requires the prose-
cutor to state
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The courts have not considered the question of what remedies are
available for a violation of Braswell's protection of the custodian's act
of production because the scope of that protection has not been consid-
ered. The Supreme Court specifically rejected the notion of construc-
tive immunity for the custodian's act of production, so it would be
anomalous to adopt wholesale the Kastigar remedy of dismissal of the
indictment if a court found a violation of Braswell's protection. More-
over, Braswell only prohibits "evidentiary use" of the act of production,
barring the prosecution from introducing evidence at trial "that the
subpoena was served upon and the corporation's documents were deliv-
ered by one particular individual, the custodian."164 The opinion does
not discuss indirect use of the act of production, which is the key pro-
tection afforded by Kastigar to immunized witnesses. If the Court in-
tended to provide the same protection to custodians as it furnishes to
witnesses granted immunity, then it would have referred to Kastigar's
prohibition on "any use," direct or indirect, of the information. Instead,
Braswell limits its protection to the more specific "evidentiary use,"
which at a minimum implies that the custodian's protection for the act
of production is short of that provided by the Fifth Amendment.
Courts have faced the related issue of whether the prosecution can
make any nonevidentiary use of immunized statements and information
derived from the testimony. In United States v. McDaniel, 65 the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that Kastigar's restriction on
"any use" of immunized information forbids "all prosecutorial use of
the testimony, not merely that which results in the presentation of evi-
dence before the jury."1 6 Among the possible nonevidentiary uses out-
lined by the appeals court are "assistance in focusing the investigation,
deciding to initiate prosecution, refusing to plea-bargain, interpreting
evidence, planning cross-examination, and otherwise generally planning
the method by which he/she will affirmatively establish either that all evidence necessary
for a conviction was in the hands of the government prior to the date of the defendant's
compelled testimony or that it came from sources independent of the witness's testimony
and was not the result of focusing an investigation on the witness because of compelled
disclosures ....
Id.
164. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 118 (1988).
165. 482 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973).
166. Id. at 311. In McDaniel, the federal prosecutor read three volumes of the defendant's
testimony that was given before a state grand jury under an automatic grant of immunity. The
prosecutor was unaware of the immunity, and the federal grand jury indicted the defendant on
charges relating to the testimony. Id. at 307-08.
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trial strategy." 16 7 More recently, courts have moved away from Mc-
Daniel's broad reading of Kastigar to find that the government need
not face the consequences of dismissal for any possible use of the infor-
mation. In United States v. Byrd, 68 the Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit rejected McDaniel's categorical prohibition on noneviden-
tiary use as leading to transactional immunity, holding that Kastigar
does not create an impenetrable barrier between the immunized infor-
mation and the prosecutor."6 If any possible use of immunized testi-
mony were prohibited, no matter how speculative, then witnesses would
have complete transactional immunity, broader than the more limited
use-immunity upheld in Kastigar. Similarly, in United States v. Mari-
ani,70 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected McDaniel
in holding that if courts were to prohibit any nonevidentiary use then it
would be impossible to ever prosecute an immunized witness.' 7 1
167. Id. at 311; see also United States v. Pantone, 634 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1980) (stating
that government met the McDaniel standard by showing no nonevidentiary use of immunized
testimony given between trial and retrial following remand); United States v. Carpenter, 611 F.
Supp. 768 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (holding that statements given after an informal grant of immunity
provided invaluable assistance in investigation, plea bargaining and trial planning in violation of
Kastigar).
168. 765 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1985).
169. Id. at 1530-31; see also United States v. Velasco, 953 F.2d 1467, 1474 (7th Cir. 1992)
(rejecting McDaniel).
170. 851 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011 (1989).
171. Id. at 601. The district court found three nonevidentiary uses of the immunized testi-
mony. These uses were (1) corroboration of other witnesses; (2) providing confirmatory informa-
tion; and (3) allowing the prosecutor to forego preparing cross-examination of the immunized
defendant because he knew the defendant would be unable to testify in light of the previous false
testimony before the grand jury. Id. at 599. The court of appeals found these nonevidentiary uses
to be "wholly conjectural and insubstantial." Id. at 601; see also United States v. Serrano, 870
F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1989) (rejecting the analysis in McDaniel because it would, in effect "grant a
defendant transactional immunity once it is shown that government attorneys or investigators
involved in the prosecution were exposed to the immunized testimony"); United States v. Crow-
son, 828 F.2d 1427, 1431-32 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that nonevidentiary uses for trial strategy
are inevitable and harmless).
Commentators are split as to whether Kastigar bars nonevidentiary use of information gained
from immunized statements. Compare Gary S. Humble, Nonevidentiary Use of Compelled Testi-
mony: Beyond the Fifth Amendment, 66 TEx. L. REV. 351, 355-56 (1987) (arguing that neither
the immunity statute nor the Fifth Amendment requires the government to prove it made no
nonevidentiary use of defendant's compelled testimony) with Kristine Strachan, Self-Incrimina-
tion, Immunity, and Watergate, 56 TEx. L. REv. 791, 831 (1978) (arguing that preclusion of
nonevidentiary use of immunized testimony should be broader than exclusion of coerced confes-
sions) and Jefferson Keenan, Note, Nonevidentiary Use of Compelled Testimony and the In-
creased Likelihood of Conviction, 32 ARIZ. L. REv. 173, 188 (1990) (stating that a requirement
for independent sources of evidence to be used at trial is not sufficient to protect the defendant
from increased likelihood of conviction if prejudicial nonevidentiary uses are allowed).
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The problem with determining the scope of Kastigar's prohibition
on use of immunized testimony is that there is no clear line between
nonevidentiary and indirect evidentiary use. In United States v.
North,17 involving the Iran-Contra prosecution of Lieutenant-Colonel
Oliver North, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit considered
whether the use by witnesses of North's immunized congressional testi-
mony to refresh their recollection constituted a violation of Kastigar.
Although the court criticized Byrd and other cases for accepting nonev-
identiary use of immunized testimony, calling those decisions "troub-
ling," it avoided the issue by designating the use against North as indi-
rect evidentiary use.173 Given its finding of indirect evidentiary use, it is
not clear why the court of appeals even addressed the issue of nonevi-
dentiary use. North is not really different from Hampton, where the
prosecutors sought to use immunized testimony indirectly against the
defendant through another witness.7 4
North highlights the problem of determining the permissible limits
of prosecutorial use of immunized testimony. While access to immu-
nized testimony may have some effect on the decision to prosecute and
the conduct of the trial, defendants need to prove some direct link be-
tween their immunized testimony and the evidence used against them
at trial. For example, if the purpose in seeking to compel testimony is
to discover the defendant's testimony or determine the types of charges
to be filed, then such use would probably be prohibited because there is
an obvious connection to the evidence that is introduced at trial. If the
relationship is only speculative, for example the immunized testimony
confirmed evidence the prosecution already possessed, then a court is
more likely to find any link between the compelled testimony and the
evidence at trial to be so attenuated that any use is nonevidentiary, and
permissible. 7 5 The label applied to the use of the evidence determines
the outcome of the decision under Kastigar.17 6
172. 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir.), modified per curiam, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, I!1 S. Ct. 2235 (1991).
173. Id. at 860. The court stated, "In our view, the use of immunized testimony by wit-
nesses to refresh their memories, or otherwise to focus their thoughts, organize their testimony, or
alter their prior or contemporaneous statements, constitutes indirect evidentiary not noneviden-
tiary use." Id. The court noted that even if nonevidentiary use of the information were prohibited
by Kastigar, the special prosecutor had made no such use of the information. Id.
174. See United States v. Hampton, 775 F.2d 1479, 1482-83 (11th Cir. 1985).
175. See United States v. Rivieccio, 919 F.2d 812, 815 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that nonevi-
dentiary use that influenced government thought process or questioning of witnesses was "merely
tangential" and not a prohibited use).
176. Courts have shown their discomfort with even nonevidentiary use of immunized testi-
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If Kastigar does not prohibit nonevidentiary use of immunized in-
formation, then Braswell's protection for the custodian cannot reach
any further. In In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Paul),'177 the subpoena for
records removed by the bank's former president may have been
designed to learn what loans and transactions were important to him,
and his act of production provided information to the prosecution.178
Although that information itself cannot be introduced at trial, Braswell
does not prohibit the use of the information in a nonevidentiary fash-
ion. The protection afforded custodians by Braswell is quite narrow be-
cause neither indirect nor nonevidentiary uses violate the requirement
that the act of production not be introduced against the defendant at
trial. The Supreme Court even acknowledged the narrowness of the
protection by noting in Braswell that it is permissible for the jury to
draw an inference that the defendant produced the corporate docu-
ments introduced at trial. 7 9
In short, the interplay of determining when a person can be com-
pelled to produce documents and what effect a grant of immunity has
on the subsequent prosecution of the witness has been greatly affected
by the Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of the scope of the
Fifth Amendment for corporate records. The witness in possession of
documents has very few means to resist a subpoena, and the courts
have favored the government by expansively interpreting what consti-
tutes a corporate record and who can fill the role of custodian of the
records. Moreover, there is even a means to overcome the Fifth
Amendment, through the required records exception. The protection
afforded to custodians in Braswell is not as extensive as that provided
mony by admonishing prosecutors to erect barriers between the attorney taking the immunized
testimony and the attorney assigned to conduct the trial, in order to limit any taint from compel-
ling the witness to testify. See United States v. Schwimmer, 882 F.2d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 1989)
(suggesting that the government should create "chinese wall" procedures to protect against taint-
ing any subsequent trial), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990); United States v. Serrano, 870 F.2d
I, 18 n.18 (1st Cir. 1989) (criticizing the government for not following Justice Department proce-
dures for keeping the attorney who prosecutes the case from immunized testimony); United States
v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524, 1532 n.ll (11th Cir. 1985) (suggesting that it is unwise to permit a
prosecutor familiar with immunized testimony to participate in trial). The Justice Department
requires prosecutors to show that they will not make nonevidentiary use of immunized testimony
against the witness, and recommends having an attorney unfamiliar with the compelled testimony
conduct the trial. See U.S. AT'VYs MANUAL, supra note 163, § 9-23.400.
177. 957 F.2d 807 (11th Cir. 1992).
178. See supra text accompanying notes 106-08 (discussing the reasons for the govern-
ment's subpoena in In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Paul), 957 F.2d 807 (1 1th Cir. 1992)).
179. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 118 (1988).
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to witnesses granted use immunity, and the courts do not automatically
bar nonevidentiary use of immunized information.
The strength of the prosecution's position in the conduct of white
collar investigations is underscored by the fact that witnesses have few
protections at the pre-indictment stage under the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. Kastigar places substantial obstacles in the path of
prosecutors seeking to convict immunized witnesses, yet statements
from the participants in economic crimes can be crucial to explaining
the documents related to a suspicious transaction. The government rou-
tinely seeks incriminating information from witnesses outside of the
grand jury without any grant of immunity or the consent of the wit-
ness's counsel. Similar to the trend in requiring production of docu-
ments, courts have generally favored the government in deciding the
scope of protection to be afforded to defendants and investigative
targets who are represented by counsel. The next section analyzes the
various arguments propounded against the tactics used by prosecutors
to secure incriminating admissions in white collar investigations.
III. PROTECTING CLIENTS FROM THEMSELVES: INCRIMINATING
STATEMENTS, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE ETHICAL
RULES
Documents are the foundation of any white collar investigation be-
cause they are the objective material showing the process of the trans-
actions at issue. Much like a weapon or drug sample, corporate records
have an immutable character that furnishes the basis for an initial con-
clusion that a criminal violation occurred. Nevertheless, a successful
prosecution cannot be made on the documents alone, just as a murder
cannot be proven with just the corpus delicti. While the documents
establish the foundation for the crime, participants flesh out the bare
facts in the records with testimony as to intent, knowledge and mo-
tive.'8 0 Often the best witness is the defendant herself, if she made in-
criminating statements to investigators or co-conspirators; information
from co-conspirators can also be crucial in sorting out the paper trail
and explaining the thought processes of the defendants in pursuing a
series of transactions.
The prosecutor's best chance at gathering information directly
from targets is at the pre-indictment stage of the investigation. Once a
180. Cf. Christi Harlan, Gaubert Arrest Shows Prosecutors' Drive, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14,
1992, at B5.
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person is indicted, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel bars all con-
tacts with the represented defendant outside the presence of counsel. 81
The indictment is the critical point for the government's investigation
because the defendant's constitutional and statutory rights attach and
the prosecutor's latitude to continue the investigation is substantially
limited. 182 The prosecution may use a co-conspirator who has agreed to
cooperate to learn information about the crimes charged, but the gov-
ernment puts its indictment at risk if it seeks to learn information
about the defendant's case through a secret informer in violation of the
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.
The Supreme Court has begun to take a more restrictive view of
the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the post-indict-
ment stage of criminal proceedings. In Caplin & Drysdale v. United
States, 3 the Court held that an asset forfeiture statute that may de-
prive a defendant of the funds necessary to retain counsel is constitu-
tional.184 The Court rejected the argument that defendants have a right
to the counsel of their choice, finding instead that the Sixth Amend-
ment does not infringe Congress's power to enact a statute that de-
prives a person of the "economic power to retain private counsel."' 85
In Wheat v. United States,86 the Court considered whether the
Sixth Amendment protected a defendant's choice to be represented by
an attorney with a potential conflict of interest arising from his repre-
181. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
182. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d 61, 70 (1st Cir. 1987) ("It is well
established that a grand jury may not conduct an investigation for the primary purpose of helping
the prosecution prepare indictments for trial. The prosecutor at a trial, however, may use evidence
incidentally gained from a grand jury primarily investigating other crimes.") (citations omitted).
183. 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
184. Id. at 635; see also 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A) (1988) (permitting a court to issue a
restraining order forbidding the transfer of potentially forfeitable property). In Caplin & Drys-
dale, 491 U.S. at 619-21, the defendant was charged with conducting a large drug importation
and distribution scheme that constituted a "continuing criminal enterprise" for purposes of asset
forfeiture. After imposition of the restraining order, the defendant sought to transfer $25,000 to
his attorney to pay for legal counsel. Id.
185. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 630. The Court rejected the defendant's argument
that the complex nature of the offenses charged should permit the defendant to use assets that
may have been generated by the criminal activity to retain skilled counsel of choice. The effect of
this argument as seen by the Court was that every indigent defendant charged with participating
in complex criminal activity could assert an ineffectiveness of counsel claim for having to rely on
appointed counsel. Id. at 630 n.7.
In a companion case, United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989), the Supreme Court
rejected the argument that the asset forfeiture statute implicitly exempts attorneys fees from the
forfeiture provisions. Id. at 611.
186. 486 U.S. 154 (1988).
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sentation of other parties to a conspiracy. The Court held that even
when the defendant knowingly waives the conflict, district courts have
broad discretion to disqualify attorneys with potential conflicts based
on the "institutional interest in the rendition of just verdicts in criminal
cases [that] may be jeopardized by unregulated multiple representa-
tion.1187 As Professor Karlan's analysis of the change in the Supreme
Court's attitude toward the scope of the Sixth Amendment points out,
the shift relates to the different types of cases before the Court: In-
stances of discrete representation of indigent defendants accused of
street crimes has given way to relational representation on a continuing
basis by attorneys for criminal enterprises and defendants.21 The
Court appears to be more willing to rule against defendants where
counsel may in fact aid the commission of crimes by protecting those
who control the enterprise from being indicted and convicted through
the provision of ongoing legal services.
Caplin & Drysdale and Wheat are concerned with the post-indict-
ment stage of the criminal case. At the pre-indictment phase of the
white collar investigation, the issues center more on the scope of the
attorney-client privilege and any restrictions that may be placed on the
conduct of government attorneys in participating in investigations
through the ethical rules of the legal profession. The prosecutor gener-
ally cannot use the criminal asset forfeiture provisions apart from an
indictment or other criminal charge, and the question of multiple repre-
sentation is not yet ripe for review because even the potential conflicts
may not have arisen when no one has been indicted. The benefits from
having one attorney represent multiple targets in an investigation is
that the attorney can control the flow of information from the defense,
present a united front to the government, and be aware of each step the
government takes with regard to any target. For example, an offer of
immunity and any subsequent cooperation will become known to each
target because of the single legal representative.
Although the targets of an investigation may have some power to
impede or control an investigation, the trend in the Sixth Amendment
area highlights the shift in favor of the prosecution in investigations of
white collar crimes. Courts have been unwilling to restrict the use of
undercover tactics to elicit statements from represented targets outside
the presence of their counsel. Moreover, prosecutors have become more
187. Id. at 160.
188. Karlan, supra note 4, at 679-86.
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aggressive in seeking information from attorneys about their clients
through the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege and
subpoenas for client identity and fee arrangements. Issues related to
the attorney-client privilege have largely superseded the earlier empha-
sis on the right to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in
police interrogations. The resulting shift in favor of prosecutors is not
surprising given the Supreme Court's hostility to the use of the Fifth
Amendment to shield business records from being produced, and the
Sixth Amendment to permit defendants to use the proceeds of alleged
illegal activity to retain high-priced legal counsel.
A. Joint Defense Agreements and the Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest and probably most
widely known privilege under the common law. 8 9 The Supreme Court
summarized the rationale of the privilege this way:
Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and
their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of
law and administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal ad-
vice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends
upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client."'0
To invoke the privilege, the proponent must demonstrate that the
communication was made to an attorney or an agent of the attorney in
the course of seeking legal advice, and that the party intended the com-
munication to be confidential. 9' The privilege protects only communi-
189. 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE. EVIDENCE § 2290 (John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit described the privilege as follows: "Narrowly de-
fined, riddled with exceptions, and subject to continuing criticism, the rule affording confidential-
ity to communications between attorney and client endures as the oldest rule of privilege known to
the common law." United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989).
190. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S 383, 389 (1981).
191. The classic formulation of the rule is Judge Wyzanski's statement in United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950):
The privilege applies only if (I) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become
a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar
of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with the communication is acting as a
lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by
his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily
either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding,
and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been
(a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
Id. at 358-59; see also 8 WIGMORE, supra note 189, § 2292 (listing the elements of the attorney-
client privilege); Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1450,
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cations and not the underlying facts discussed with counsel or any doc-
uments prepared by or on behalf of the client apart from the attorney-
client relationship.
The benefit of the attorney-client privilege in fostering complete
communication with one's counsel is especially applicable in ihe multi-
party context because counsel can gather all the information necessary
to investigate the matter without fear that the government can force
disclosure of the communications. At the pre-indictment stage, how-
ever, targets of the investigation will often seek separate legal counsel;
corporations whose officers are also involved in investigations will fre-
quently provide separate counsel at the company's expense. The value
of having separate counsel to represent one personally may be under-
mined if the attorneys for the targets cannot gather information in a
manner that protects communications with other targets under the at-
torney-client privilege. Moreover, while the ethical rules prohibit an at-
torney from representing clients that may have a conflict of interest, it
can be argued that it is incongruous to penalize clients if the conflict of
interest rules that are designed to protect them result in less adequate
representation because the attorneys cannot communicate with one an-
other. The courts have addressed this issue by recognizing the "joint
defense" privilege as derivative of the attorney-client privilege.1 92
To qualify for protection under the joint defense privilege, the
communications must meet the basic requirements of the attorney-cli-
ent privilege and demonstrate that "(1) the communications were made
in the course of a joint defense effort, (2) the statements were designed
1502-09 (1985) (analyzing the benefits and burdens of the attorney-client privilege on the judicial
system).
192. Although courts have used the term "joint defense privilege," that misstates its scope
because it is neither limited to defendants nor is it necessary for actual litigation to commence for
the privilege to be applicable. See, e.g., United States v. Bay State Ambulance and Hosp. Rental
Serv., 874 F.2d 20, 28 (1st Cir. 1989) (using the term "joint defense privilege"); see also Daniel
J. Capra, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Common Representations, 20 TRIAL LAW. Q. 20
(1989) (stating that the term is a misnomer). One commentator has argued that the joint defense
privilege should be recognized as separate from the attorney-client privilege and not as deriving
from that privilege. See Susan K. Rushing, Note, Separating the Joint-Defense Doctrine from the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 68 TEx. L. REv. 1273 (1990). It is unclear, however, how the privilege
can be severed from its roots in the attorney-client privilege without allowing the doctrine to
protect any discussion between parties that share a common interest, which would include commu-
nications between parties outside the presence of either of their counsel. The effect of protecting
these communications would be to undermine the use of cooperating witnesses to elicit incriminat-
ing statements from targets of the investigation at the pre-indictment stage. It is doubtful that the
courts will permit the joint defense privilege to eliminate one of the cornerstones of white collar
investigations through the creation of a new privilege.
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to further the effort, and (3) the privilege has not been waived. 11 93 The
parties need not share identical interests, nor are they precluded from
having certain conflicting positions among themselves, but there must
be a degree of congruity between them such that a court can determine
that they have agreed to act cooperatively. The joint defense privilege
may attach before litigation even commences, and it applies in both the
criminal and civil contexts."" The key facet of the joint defense privi-
lege is that the privilege can only be waived by all members of the
common group, and a single member cannot reveal the communications
made in the course of the common action. 195 In the criminal context,
the scope of the privilege is important because the communications
need not be made to one's own attorney, but include all statements
within the scope of the joint defense to any other counsel.'9
To protect communications under the joint defense privilege, the
court must first determine whether in fact there is an agreement to
conduct a joint defense. In United States v. Bay State Ambulance and
Hospital Rental Service,1 7 the court found that a written outline of
certain conduct provided by the defendant to counsel for the corpora-
tion was not protected because there was no evidence of an agreement.
The court noted that the defendant never consulted his own attorney
about the outline, which made it difficult to see how the document was
193. In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 126 (3d Cir.
1986).
194. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 1990) ("Whether an
action is ongoing or contemplated, whether the jointly interested persons are defendants or plain-
tiffs, and whether the litigation or potential litigation is civil or criminal, the rationale for the joint
defense rule remains unchanged .... "). The joint defense privilege arose in the criminal context,
when Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized the value of extending the attorney-client
privilege to protect communications between co-defendants and their counsel. See Hunydee v.
United States, 355 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1965); Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347
(9th Cir. 1964). It has since been extended to cooperative action in response to an SEC investiga-
tion. See In re LTV Securities Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981). It has also been extended
to the exchange of documents between class action attorneys pursuing similar albeit separate ac-
tions, and to legal advice given to a parent corporation and its subsidiary regarding the sale of the
subsidiary. See Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol Lab., 689 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. I11. 1988)
(subsidiary sale case); Schachar v. American Academy of Opthamology, 106 F.R.D. 187 (N.D.
Ill. 1985) (class action case).
195. See Medcom Holding Co., 689 F. Supp. at 845.
196. The proponent of the joint defense privilege bears the burden of establishing its exis-
tence. Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d at 126. If the proponent asserts
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to questions, then the wit-
ness cannot also assert the joint defense privilege because there is no basis for concluding that it
exists based on the proponent's silence. Id.
197. 874 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1989).
[Vol. 54:405
19931 WHITE COLLAR CRIME
part of a joint defense.198 In United States v. Melvin, 9 " counsel for a
defendant asked a cooperating defendant, who stated that he did not
have counsel, to attend meetings to discuss the case. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit held that the communications were not in-
tended to be confidential because the informant had not become a
member of the defense team.2"' To establish the existence of the joint
defense privilege, parties who are involved in governmental investiga-
tions often enter into written agreements that reflect their common in-
terests in the investigation and lay the basic framework of the relation-
ship, such as sharing work product among counsel and apportioning
certain tasks to different law firms.2°0
The courts have generally been protective of joint defense agree-
ments by recognizing that they are not limited to the post-indictment
phase of the prosecution but also protect communications between
targets of investigations and their counsel.20 2 Unlike other areas relat-
ing to the conduct of white collar investigations, the trend is not in
favor of limiting the scope of the agreements because that would neces-
sarily infringe on the attorney-client privilege. 0 3 Joint defense agree-
ments may nevertheless be problematic if they are used as a means to
control the defense of lower-level members of a conspiracy to protect
the organizers, as highlighted in United States v. Allen.204 In Allen, the
198. Id. at 27.
199. 650 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. Unit B July 1981).
200. Id. at 646. The court determined that the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were
not violated because there was no breach of the joint defense privilege. See also United States v.
Bell, 776 F.2d 965, 971-72 (11 th Cir. 1985) (holding no expectation of confidentiality existed
when the defendant approached two government informants to attend a meeting with his own
counsel and the informants stated that they had retained other counsel), cert. denied, 447 U.S.
904 (1986).
201. See Marc I. Steinberg & Daniel R. Rogers, The Joint Defense Doctrine in Federal
Securities Litigation, 18 SEc. REG. LJ. 339, 357-58 (1991) (providing a model joint defense
agreement).
202. See, e.g., Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1964).
203. The joint defense may raise conflict-of-interest questions if the attorney learns confi-
dential information in the course of representation and one member of the joint defense cooperates
with the government. The recipient of communications protected by the privilege cannot reveal
them. Therefore, cross-examination of the cooperating witness may be limited to avoid revealing
any protected communications. Nevertheless, the defense of the other members could be adversely
affected. In United States v. Bicoastal Corp., No. 92-CR-261, slip op. at 13 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28,
1992). the court permitted the defendants to waive any potential conflict arising from a joint
defense in which some members were granted immunity, and would be called as government wit-
nesses. See also Arthur F. Mathews, Assessing a New Ruling on Joint Defense, NAT'L L.J., Nov.
23, 1992, at 16 (discussing the Bicoastal opinion).
204. 831 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied., 487 U.S. 1237 (1988).
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defendant was part of a massive drug-importation conspiracy in which
all of the defendants ultimately had separate counsel. One firm, how-
ever, acting on behalf of the leaders of the conspiracy, coordinated the
defense and served as a conduit for all legal fees. The lead attorneys
counseled the defendants to present a "united front" and may have
presented a misleading picture of Allen's actual culpability in negotiat-
ing a plea bargain to protect other organizers.2 05 Although the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the defendant had not been
adequately informed "of the gross conflicts underlying this joint repre-
sentation," Allen subsequently withdrew his plea and was convicted af-
ter a trial in which he had independent counsel.20 6 The only remedy for
a violation of the defendant's right to conflict-free counsel is a new
trial, which Allen received. That remedy, however, is ineffective where
the pre-indictment stage is the crucial period in which targets can seek
to make favorable arrangements with the prosecutor in exchange for
immunity or lighter punishment.
The joint defense privilege does not protect communications
among the defendants or investigative targets outside the presence of
their counsel, where those communications would not otherwise be cov-
ered by the attorney-client privilege. Statements that are not made in
the presence of an attorney are not in connection with seeking legal
advice, a condition for invoking the privilege.20 7 The government may
seek to learn the content of discussions among joint defendants or
targets and an attorney by arguing that there was no agreement, or
that there was no intention to keep the communications confidential,
but that is a doubtful proposition because experienced defense counsel
will reach an agreement before permitting such a meeting. A joint de-
fense agreement does not preclude the prosecution from using a cooper-
ating defendant or target to contact others seeking incriminating state-
ments. The problem arises where a cooperating witness who is also a
member of the joint defense becomes privy to the defense strategy.
The prosecutor may not intentionally "invade the defense camp"
for information, but the Supreme Court recognized in Weatherford v.
205. Id. at 1489-93.
206. Id. at 1502-03. The court of appeals noted that it was "deeply troubled" by the lead
law firm's representation of the defendants, "and by the potential for such conduct to infect and
invalidate an entire proceeding .... " Id. at 1503.
207. See United States v. Gotti, 771 F. Supp. 535, 545 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that ex-
tension of joint defense privilege to conversations among defendants in the absence of any attorney
"is supported neither in law nor in logic").
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Bursey °0 that the government can authorize a cooperating witness to
attend a meeting with counsel for other defendants to maintain the wit-
ness's cover. Weatherford requires that a defendant show prejudice
arising from the government having an informant attend a meeting
with the defense attorney to constitute a violation of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel. 209 In United States v. Mastroianni,210  an
unindicted informant attended a meeting with counsel for a defendant
out of fear that revealing his cooperation would endanger his safety.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the government
bears the burden of proving the necessity of the informant's attendance
at the meeting to avoid a finding of a Sixth Amendment violation. Even
if the informant may attend the meeting, the government cannot use
that opportunity to learn about the issues discussed and the direction of
the defense.211
Courts are split on determining the quantum of prejudice the de-
fendant must show from a government informant's attendance at meet-
ings with defense counsel to constitute a violation of the Sixth Amend-
ment. In United States v. Hernandez,1 2 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit found that a cooperating defendant's participation
throughout the planning stages of a joint defense did not rise to the
level of a Sixth Amendment violation because the informant did not
learn anything of import about the defense and therefore any informa-
tion passed to the government could not have prejudiced the other de-
fendants.21 3 Despite the court of appeals' conclusion, the timing of the
frequent contacts between the informant and government agents, and
the denials that they ever discussed the pending case, appear curious.1 4
208. 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
209. Id. at 558 (stating that, unless there is "at least a realistic possibility of injury to [the
defendant] or benefit to the state, there can be no Sixth Amendment violation").
210. 749 F.2d 900 (lst Cir. 1984).
211. Id. at 906-07. The court criticized the government for debriefing the informant after
the meetings as an unjustified intrusion into the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 907. The Justice
Department's proposed rule on communications with represented persons would prohibit any com-
munication of information about the defense to the prosecutors or investigative agents. See 57
Fed. Reg. 54737, 54743 (1992) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 77.8(b)) (proposed Nov. 20, 1992).
212. 937 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1991).
213. Id. at 1494; see also United States v. Posner, 637 F. Supp. 456, 459 (S.D. Fla. 1986)
(holding that meetings with a co-defendant and his attorney, who were parties to a joint defense
agreement, were not an "egregious or shocking intrusion by the government into [the] attorney-
client relationship" when the information gained was innocuous and repetitive).
214. The court of appeals noted that the cooperating defendant "was in frequent contact
with" government agents throughout the time the defendant or his counsel participated in joint
strategy sessions. Hernandez, 937 F.2d at 1492.
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That illustrates the problem defendants face in proving prejudice be-
cause there is rarely any direct evidence that the government purpose-
fully sought information about the defense or the effect at a trial in
which the defendants have been convicted.
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, on the other hand, held
that "[m]ere possession by the prosecution of otherwise confidential
knowledge about the defense's strategy or position is . . . sufficient to
establish detriment to the criminal defendant."2 15 The weakness of us-
ing a per se approach is that defendants or targets who suspect that a
confederate might cooperate with the government will hold frequent
meetings to discuss some aspect of the joint defense strategy in order to
insulate themselves from the effect of an informer. If a confederate
does not attend a meeting, that may signal the person has begun to
cooperate; if everyone attends, then the defendants can be secure in the
knowledge that the presence of an informer will establish a Sixth
Amendment violation through a breach of the attorney-client privilege.
As an intermediate position, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
shifts the burden of proving the absence of prejudice to the government
where the defendant can show that the confidential information was
"conveyed as a result of the presence of a government informant at a
defense meeting. '216
Perhaps the easiest solution to the problem posed by having an
informant attend a defense meeting is to isolate the information from
the prosecutors assigned to the investigation by having another prosecu-
tor debrief the informant and instruct her not to communicate informa-
tion learned at the meeting to anyone else.21 Although burdensome,
this procedure demonstrates the prosecution's good faith in trying to
avoid any purposeful invasion of the defense camp. The joint defense
privilege is an important shield, but it should not also be a sword by
which the ringleaders of criminal enterprises can forestall the effective
215. Briggs v. Goodwin, 698 F.2d 486, 494-95 (D.C. Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 712
F.2d 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984); see also United States v. Levy,
577 F.2d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 1978) ("[I]nquiry into prejudice must stop at the point where attor-
ney-client confidences are actually disclosed to the government enforcement agencies responsible
for investigating and prosecuting the case.").
216. United States v. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d 900, 907-08 (1st Cir. 1984).
217. See 57 Fed. Reg. 54737, 54743 (1992) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 77.8(b)) (pro-
posed Nov. 20, 1992) (stating that any information regarding defense strategy or trial preparation
"shall not be communicated to attorneys for the government or to law enforcement agents who are
participating in the prosecution of the pending criminal charges .... ").
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use of cooperating witnesses who can provide crucial evidence against
them.
B. The Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege
Although co-conspirators are a prime source of statements by par-
ticipants in the illegal activity, communications by defendants and
targets to their attorneys are also fertile ground for incriminating state-
ments. The attorney-client privilege protects communications except
where the client seeks advice in furtherance of a crime or fraud. With
the advent of continuing relationships between lawyers and clients in
providing advice to business enterprises, the potential for using an at-
torney as an unwitting, or even witting, participant in criminal activity
increases. The shift in federal criminal prosecutions toward the pursuit
of white collar crime creates a need to seek information from any
source that can provide the details of how the transactions were struc-
tured and what the purpose of the activity was. The crime-fraud excep-
tion to the attorney-client privilege has become more important as at-
torneys play an increasing role in advising clients in business activities
that may be the subject of a criminal investigation. 18
The crime-fraud exception has roots as deep in the common law as
the attorney-client privilege.21 It provides that "[c]ommunications oth-
erwise protected by the attorney-client privilege are not protected if the
communications are made in furtherance of a crime, fraud, or other
misconduct. ' 220 The exception only applies to pending or contemplated
crimes or fraud and not to communications about completed acts for
which a client seeks legal advice.221 The communication must be re-
218. See Earl J. Silbert, The Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege and
Work-Product Doctrine, the Lawyer's Obligations of Disclosure, and the Lawyer's Response to
Accusation of Wrongful Conduct, 23 Am. CRIm. L. REV. 351 (1986) [hereinafter Crime-Fraud
Exception] ("The government invokes [the crime-fraud exception] because lawyers have a promi-
nent role in complex transactions in areas which are the subject of increasing criminal investiga-
tions, such as tax, banking, and securities.").
219. See David J. Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Exception to the Attorney-Client
Privilege for Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C. L. REV. 443, 446-61 (1986) (tracing
thoroughly the history of the exception).
220. In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The exception also applies to
attorney work-product that is related to the crime or fraud. See In re Vargas, 723 F.2d 1461,
1467 (10th Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir. 1979).
221. Communications after the crime has been completed do not qualify for the exception
even if they only memorialize communications with an attorney who participated in the crime. In
In re Federal Grand Jury Proceedings, 938 F.2d 1578 (11 th Cir. 1991), the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit held that "although communications otherwise covered by the attorney-client
privilege lose their privileged status when used to further a crime or fraud, post-crime repetition Or
1993]
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lated to the illegal or fraudulent acts under consideration, although the
attorney need not be aware that the advice is in furtherance of an im-
proper scheme.22 The "in furtherance" requirement is liberally con-
strued by courts because the prosecution will not know the content of
the attorney-client communications and therefore cannot show conclu-
sively the connection between the legal advice and the alleged illegal
act.2 3 Nevertheless, the mere proximity in time between the communi-
cation with an attorney and the crime or fraud does not conclusively
establish the requisite connection to overcome the privilege.224
The crime-fraud exception has expanded considerably due to the
growth of government regulation of business activity that results in
greater reporting requirements incorporating criminal penalties for fail-
ing to comply with the proper procedures or for supplying false infor-
mation. Not only can more acts be labelled "criminal" or "fraudulent,"
but lawyers play such a pervasive role in advising clients on complying
with or avoiding regulatory schemes that the opportunity to use legal
advice to commit an illegal act has increased correspondingly.2 25 More-
over, the improper act does not have to be a violation of a specific crim-
discussion of such earlier communications . . . may still be privileged even though those earlier
communications were not privileged because of the crime-fraud exception." Id. at 1582.
222. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Marc Rich & Co.), 731 F.2d 1032,
1038 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that communications are excluded from the privilege "even if the
attorney is unaware that his advice is sought in furtherance of such an improper purpose"). The
person seeking legal advice need not even be a knowing participant in the crime or fraud if there
is a nexus between the communications and the illegal act. See Duttle v. Bandler & Kass, 127
F.R.D. 46, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that crime-fraud exception applies to communications by
corporate personnel seeking legal advice on behalf of officers in connection with fraudulent scheme
by officers). The ethical problems that confront an attorney who discovers that a client is engaged
in an ongoing crime or fraud and is using the attorney to further an illegal act are analyzed in
Fried, supra note 219, at 490-98, and Crime-Fraud Exception, supra note 218, at 371-76.
223. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223, 1227 (11 th Cir. 1987) (determin-
ing whether communications relate to matters under investigation "must take into account that
the government does not know precisely what the material will reveal or how useful it will be").
The courts will accept a good faith statement by the prosecutor summarizing the grand jury evi-
dence that would demonstrate the connection between the attorney-client communications and the
alleged crime or fraud. See, e.g., id. at 1226; In re Vargas, 723 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1983).
224. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 798 F.2d 32, 34 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating
that the crime-fraud exception cannot be applied "merely upon a showing that the client commu-
nicated with counsel while the client was engaged in criminal activity."); In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings, 641 F.2d 199, 201 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981) (stating that, although proximity in
time may support strong suspicion of criminal activity, it is not enough to establish a prima facie
case of crime or fraud related to legal advice).
225. See Fried, supra note 219, at 470 (noting that the crime-fraud exception has expanded
because of the increased use of criminal penalties as sanctions and because of the increasing num-
ber of statutes that impose reporting requirements).
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inal provision, and the act only has to be one objective of seeking the
legal advice for the exception to apply.22 6 Therefore, the question of
whether an alleged course of conduct qualifies as a crime or fraud is
rarely at issue because the breadth of white collar criminal law encom-
passes most acts which are of questionable legality.
As prosecutors have more opportunities to raise the crime-fraud
issue, the doctrine has evolved from determining whether the contem-
plated acts are crimes or fraud, to what measure of proof the party
asserting the exception must proffer to establish that the communica-
tions are not privileged. The crime-fraud exception poses analytical
problems because the communication itself is the best proof of whether
the advice was in furtherance of a crime or fraud, yet the privilege
must protect communications from being revealed or its value is se-
verely diminished.227 The circularity in asserting that the communica-
tion is dispositive of whether the privilege applies to it is compounded
by the fact that prosecutors arguing for the crime-fraud exception will
necessarily have only a limited amount of information about the con-
tent of the discussions on which to move for disclosure. Without de-
tailed knowledge of the communication, the issue arises as to how
much specificity a court can require from the government to even en-
tertain the question of whether the exception applies. The traditional
rule is that the prosecution must make a prima facie showing of a
crime or fraud and need not prove an illegal act beyond a reasonable
doubt; but even that standard begs the question of what evidence the
court can consider in determining whether there is a prima facie
case.
228
In United States v. Zolin,229 the Supreme Court considered the
propriety of in camera review of an attorney-client communication to
determine whether the crime-fraud exception applied. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Zolin had followed its rule that the
prosecution must adduce "independent evidence" of the alleged crime
226. Marc Rich & Co., 731 F.2d at 1039; see also Finley Assocs. v. Sea & Pines Consol.
Corp., 714 F. Supp. 110, 117-18 (D. Del. 1989) (stating that courts do not examine whether the
elements of a particular crime are established, but whether instead there is a prima facie case "to
believe any criminal or fraudulent activity occurred in the attorney-client relationship.").
227. See Christopher P. Galanek, Note, The Impact of the Zolin Decision on the Crime-
Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 24 GA. L. REV. 1115, 1124 (1990) (stating that
the inherent difficulty in applying the crime-fraud exception is the circular proof problem).
228. See In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d at 399 ("IT]he government must first make a prima
facie showing of a violation sufficiently serious to defeat the privilege ... .
229. 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
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or fraud without reference to the communications at issue;2 30 the Su-
preme Court rejected that as too stringent. Instead, Zolin provides that
a district court may conduct an in camera review of the questioned
communication and consider it in determining whether the crime-fraud
exception applies.231 The Court accepted the circularity inherent in the
crime-fraud exception's use of the communication to determine the ap-
plicability of the privilege to it. The Court then had to determine the
requisite showing the prosecution must make to have a district court
conduct an in camera review.232
Zolin rejects a blanket rule permitting in camera review upon re-
quest by the party opposing the privilege, finding that such a position
would permit parties "to engage in groundless fishing expeditions, with
the district courts as their unwitting (and perhaps unwilling)
agents."2 3 3 Instead, the Court requires that the prosecution provide a
factual basis "'adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable
person'" that the in camera review "may reveal evidence to establish
the claim that the crime-fraud exception applies. 23 4 The Court noted
that this preliminary standard is lower than the evidence necessary for
the ultimate determination of whether the attorney-client privilege is
overcome because of a crime or fraud. 3 5 While Zolin thus rejects the
proposition that it is addressing the issue of what quantum of proof is
necessary to vitiate a claim of privilege, the Court's analysis of how
much evidence must be introduced to have a district court conduct an
in camera review effectively resolves the issue of what proof is sufficient
to establish the application of the crime-fraud exception.
Once the government provides enough of a factual basis to meet
the good faith belief threshold,23 6 then the in camera review itself will
230. Id. at 560-61.
231. Id. at 574-75. The Court rejected the rule enunciated by the Ninth Circuit in United
States v. Shewfelt, 455 F.2d 836 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 944 (1972), as inconsistent
with the policies underlying the attorney-client privilege because an absolute bar against in cam-
era review without independent evidence imposed costs that were "intolerably high." Zolin, 491
U.S. at 569.
232. The Court specifically avoided deciding the question of what quantum of proof is nec-
essary to establish the crime-fraud exception. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 563.
233. Id. at 571.
234. Id. at 572 (quoting Caldwell v. District Court, 644 P.2d 26, 33 (Colo. 1982)).
235. Id.
236. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that a district court considering
whether the government has met the minimal threshold should engage in "some speculation" to
determine whether the crime-fraud exception exists. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 974 F.2d
1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 1992).
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frequently provide the evidence formerly unavailable to satisfy the bur-
den of finding the crime-fraud exception. If the communication is not
incriminating, then there is no prima facie case of a crime or fraud, but
the government is not hurt because the statement would not provide
any additional information for the investigation or aid in prosecuting
the client or attorney. If the communication is incriminating, then
there is a prima facie showing of a crime or fraud. Under these circum-
stances, a court will, in all likelihood, be more willing to find that the
"in furtherance" requirement has been satisfied than it would have
been without seeing the communication. By lowering the threshold for
permitting in camera review, Zolin makes it more likely that the prose-
cution will be able to bring attorney-client communications before the
district court, and increases the possibility of overriding the attorney-
client privilege.
Zolin does not, however, invite wholesale attacks on client consul-
tations with counsel. At the pre-indictment stage, seeking to compel
testimony by an attorney, and the resultant litigation, imposes a burden
on scarce prosecutorial resources that diverts attention from the investi-
gation and may cause an extensive delay without any reasonable assur-
ance of a commensurate benefit. Moreover, the time-consuming nature
of the litigation involved in deciding the issue may cause the govern-
ment to run the risk of losing prosecutable transactions under the stat-
ute of limitations since white collar investigations often take place well
after the completion of the transaction. Prosecutors are more likely to
pursue efforts to overcome the attorney-client privilege where they have
a sound basis for concluding that the communications revealed will
substantially advance the case, rather than engage in fishing
expeditions.
Although the lower threshold may increase the likelihood that
prosecutors will seek to learn the content of client contacts with law-
yers, that does not in and of itself demonstrate that there will be
abuses. As the Court noted in a similar context in Caplin & Drysdale,
the fact that a prosecutor could abuse the power to seek to have an
attorney testify about client communications under the crime-fraud ex-
ception does not undermine the rationale of the rule. Zolin only estab-
lishes the evidentiary threshold for the district court to conduct an in
camera review, but does not invest a new power in the government to
seek information from attorneys.237
237. Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 634 (1989). But see Fried, supra
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The increased availability of the crime-fraud exception may have a
strong effect on the use of joint defense agreements. If the government
can make the requisite showing that the conduct of the joint defense
was designed to obstruct an investigation, which is a criminal act, then
the communications among the attorneys and with the clients could be
open to examination insofar as they relate to the alleged obstruction. If
one of the parties to the joint defense agrees to cooperate with the gov-
ernment's investigation, then that person can provide information to
meet the initial good faith belief requirement to have the district court
consider an in camera submission of the communications relating the
existence of a crime or fraud. Although an individual member of a
joint defense may not reveal in court confidences that arise from the
common effort, the crime-fraud exception can vitiate any claim of priv-
ilege for all members of the joint defense. The benefit of the joint de-
fense agreement in holding the participants together is undermined to
the extent that a goal of the common effort is to obstruct a governmen-
tal investigation.
C. Nonprivileged Information: Subpoenas to Attorneys for Client
Identity and Fee Information
Not all information related to the attorney-client relationship
qualifies as privileged and protected from disclosure in the absence of a
waiver. Courts recognize a general rule that the identity of a client and
fee arrangements are not protected as privileged, although the rationale
for that conclusion is not entirely clear. The client's identity and fee
information may not involve any communication with the lawyer, fail-
ing a requirement of the attorney-client privilege, although that is cer-
tainly not always the case. For example, the attorney's fee may be paid
by a wire transfer that identifies the party sending the funds, but there
is no possible client communication relating to the transfer of funds
between financial institutions. The client also may not intend that com-
munication on those topics be accorded any confidentiality, but there
are certainly plausible instances where maintaining confidentiality is of
the utmost importance. The very fact that one has retained counsel,
and even the practice specialty of that attorney, may be highly suspi-
note 219, at 473 (stating that recent emphasis on white collar crime "presents prosecutors with
new temptations to make the examination of attorneys an integral part of their investigations").
Given the degree to which lawyers are involved in business transactions that may be the subject of
white collar investigations, it would be surprising if prosecutors ignored them as a source of
information.
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cious; therefore, any transaction could entail a significant communica-
tion that a client wants to be considered confidential. Although the is-
sue of client identity and fee information has a degree of simplicity
surrounding it, it has in fact been the subject of increased scrutiny to
determine the scope of the rule and whether there are instances where
a court can prohibit disclosure to the prosecution.
Information about client identity and fee arrangements may be of
particular interest to a prosecutor where an undisclosed third party is
paying the fees for one or more defendants or targets of an investiga-
tion, a situation arising quite frequently in large scale drug distribution
schemes. Similarly, the source and amount of an attorney's fee can be
important in white collar investigations where the target may be trying
to hide assets or launder proceeds of illegal activity. The usual means
to learn the client's identity and any fee arrangements is to subpoena
the attorney to the grand jury investigating the matter for questioning
limited to areas outside the scope of the attorney-client privilege. Un-
like the crime-fraud exception, the government need not meet any evi-
dentiary threshold to compel disclosure of the information. The use of
grand jury subpoenas to attorneys has grown in use, and has been de-
cried by commentators as placing an unfair burden on the attorney-
client relationship by turning lawyers into informants about their
clients. 38
238. See Attorney-Client Relationship, supra note 25, at 237 (arguing that the disclosure of
information deters formation of the attorney-client relationship, imposes ethical dilemmas on at-
torneys, and "skews the adversary system through ad hoc disqualification" that outweighs any
gain from the disclosure); Stern & Hoffman, supra note 25, at 1830 ("[A] regime that grants
prosecutors the virtually uninhibited power to destabilize or destroy the legal representation of an
adversary, by the simple means of a well-aimed subpoena, is inconsistent with the fundamental
tenets of our legal system.").
The U.S. Department of Justice has promulgated policy guidelines for issuing subpoenas to
attorneys for information relating to the representation of a client. The policy requires inter alia
that the prosecutor (1) attempt to obtain the information from other sources, (2) seek to obtain
the information voluntarily, and (3) receive approval from the assistant attorney general of the
Criminal Division before issuance of the subpoena. U.S. AT'rys MANUAL, supra note 163, § 9-
2.161(a). Although the policy does not create an enforceable right for attorneys or their clients, it
does limit federal prosecutors' ability to seek information from attorneys through the use of sub-
poenas, and recognizes the potential adverse effects a subpoena may have on the attorney-client
relationship. See id.; see also In re Grand Jury Matter, 789 F. Supp. 693, 696 (D. Md. 1992)
(stating that the Justice Department guidelines adequately protect against the abuse of subpoena
power directed against attorneys). Stern and Hoffman criticize the policy for, among other things,
distinguishing between subpoenas for privileged and nonprivileged information, such as client
identity and fee arrangements. Stern & Hoffman, supra note 25, at 1820. The Justice Department
policy does not distinguish between the types of information, but instead covers all subpoenas to
attorneys for "information relating to the representation of a client," regardless of whether that
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Courts have struggled to find an analytically clear means to place
some limits on the prosecution's right to learn the identity of clients
and fee arrangements without substantially altering the rule that such
information is not privileged. The initial focus was on the incriminatory
nature of the information, that revealing the client's identity would ef-
fectively incriminate the person. 39 The weakness of the incrimination
approach is that the inculpatory nature of the information is irrelevant
to the applicability of the attorney-client privilege. The privilege as-
sumes that certain communications between a lawyer and client may
implicate the person in a crime, yet the communication is privileged
because the benefit of seeking legal counsel outweighs the burden of
shielding incriminating information. 40
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit sought to refine the
incrimination analysis by proposing the "last link" exception to the
general rule that client identity and fee information was not privileged:
The attorney need not reveal the information "when the disclosure of
[his] client's identity . . . would have supplied the last link in an ex-
isting chain of incriminating evidence likely to lead to the client's in-
dictment. ' 241 The last link rule confined the incrimination analysis by
requiring that the information lead directly to an indictment of the cli-
ent rather than leaving the degree of incrimination open. Focusing on
the "links" in an evidentiary chain, however, only confuses the analysis
because it encourages the government to seek the information earlier in
an investigation, so that it is not the final connection leading to an in-
dictment. Moreover, the rule makes no reference to the requirements
for protecting communications under the attorney-client privilege.
Whatever its initial appeal, courts have rejected the incrimination ra-
tionale as a basis for protecting client identity and fee information from
disclosure.242
information is privileged. U.S. ATr'ys MANUAL, supra note 163, § 9-2.161(a).
239. See United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977) ("A cli-
ent's identity and the nature of that client's fee arrangements may be privileged where the person
invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such information
would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was sought.").
240. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
241. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir. Unit A 1982).
242. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 913 F.2d 1118 (5th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Reyes-
Requena 1] (stating that Pavlick did not create a last link analysis independent of the privileged
communications with attorney), cert. denied, I !1 S. Ct. 1581 (1991); In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ing, 898 F.2d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that "incrimination has been rejected as a suffi-
cient basis for invoking the privilege."); Torney v. United States, 840 F.2d 1424, 1427 (9th Cir.
1988) (stating that incrimination rule adopted in Hodge & Zweig is dictum and is thus given no
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The analysis for compelling disclosure of client identity and fee
arrangements has shifted recently to a renewed focus on the principles
of the attorney-client relationship, that the privilege "shields the iden-
tity of a client or fee information only where revelation of such infor-
mation would disclose other privileged communications such as the
confidential motive for retention." 4 s To protect the client's identity and
fee arrangements, the client must first meet the basic requirement of
the privilege: that one has entered into an attorney-client relationship
with a lawyer. In In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Reyes-Requena I),244
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that an undisclosed
benefactor who paid the legal fees of an attorney's client had a prior
attorney-client relationship with the lawyer, and the client had sought
the legal advice for the purpose of paying the legal fees. The confidenti-
ality of the client's identity was "inextricably" related to the purpose of
seeking legal advice, and therefore compelling disclosure of the identity
would reveal the confidential communications.2"5 In In re Grand Jury
Proceedings,2" the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found
that compelling disclosure of client identity and fee information would
not reveal confidential communications where the client had retained
the attorney in a separate matter, and the payment of attorney fees for
precedential weight); Attorney-Client Relationship, supra note 25, at 246 n.5. (stating that the
"incrimination rationale has been explicitly rejected by most courts, including the Ninth Circuit,
which had been its major proponent").
243. Reyes-Requena I, 913 F.2d at 1125; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 926 F.2d
1423, 1431 (5th Cir. 1991) ("We protect the client's identity and fee arrangements in such cir-
cumstances not because they might be incriminating but because they are connected inextricably
with a privileged communication-the confidential purpose for which he sought legal advice.");
Grand Jury Proceeding, 898 F.2d at 568 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that incriminating information
may be shielded by privilege when it is an integral part of a confidential communication); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 896 F.2d 1267, 1283 (11th Cir.) (stating that the last link doctrine
protects identity when disclosure would reveal other privileged communications such as motive or
strategy), vacated as moot as stated in 904 F.2d 1498 (1Ith Cir. 1990) (en banc). But see In re
Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[I]dentification of... clients ... neither discloses nor
implies a confidential communication.").
244. 926 F.2d 1423 (5th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Reyes-Requena Ill.
245. Id. at 1431. The court of appeals rejected the government's argument that it only
sought the client's identity and not confidential communications because the reason for sending
the subpoena to the lawyer was to broaden the investigation of the drug conspiracy for which the
defendant had been charged. Id. at 1432; see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 946 F.2d 746,
748 (11th Cir. 1991) (protecting client identity where client sought legal advice on own culpabil-
ity and to pay fee of another client indicted in drug conspiracy); Grand Jury Proceeding, 898 F.2d
565, 567 (7th Cir. 1990) (protecting client identity where fee payer sought advice from lawyer in
advance of representation of defendant for whom fee paid).
246. 899 F.2d 1039 (11th Cir. 1990).
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the client by a third party did not of itself reveal any other communica-
tion, motive or strategy of the client.247
The typical situation in which an anonymous third party pays a
defendant's legal fees involves drug distribution schemes in which the
government believes that the organizers are paying the defense costs of
lower-level participants as a type of "fringe benefit" to protect them-
selves from being implicated.248 Learning the anonymous benefactor's
identity will permit the prosecution to expand its investigation and ar-
gue to the defendants that they should cooperate against the ringlead-
ers because the government already knows who they are. To prevent
the court from compelling disclosure of her identity the benefactor
must prove that she has an attorney-client relationship that involves
communications about the criminal activity with the attorney who also
represents a defendant or investigative target. Under Wheat, the prose-
cution could seek the attorney's removal from the case because of a
conflict of interest in representing two participants in a crime who may
have adverse positions, especially where it may be in the defendant's
interest to cooperate with the government by revealing the identity of
the scheme's organizers in exchange for a reduced punishment. If the
court finds a conflict and orders the attorney to cease representing the
defendant or target, then the anonymous benefactor no longer controls
the defense and runs the risk of having the defendant cooperate with
the government by supplying information about the organizers.249 The
requirement that the undisclosed benefactor demonstrate a pre-existing
attorney-client relationship may ultimately work to her detriment if the
goal is to maintain control of the defense, because the exception from
disclosure of client identity virtually requires that an attorney represent
two clients with potentially conflicting interests.
The disclosure of fee arrangements can also be attacked by the
government under the crime-fraud exception. If the payment is more
than $10,000 in cash, then the attorney must report the payment to the
247. Id. at 1044.
248. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 831 F.2d 1487, 1490 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that the
defendants were instructed to contact a law firm if arrested and the fees were paid by unidentified
person in cash), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1237 (1988); United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d
1347, 1354 (9th Cir. 1977) (explaining that co-conspirators would provide bail and legal expenses
for those who might be arrested).
249. If the client has any contact with the new attorney, that communication cannot be
privileged unless the client forms an attorney-client relationship with the new attorney, forcing the
government to again argue that the new attorney has a conflict of interest.
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Internal Revenue Service.2 50 Failure to properly report cash payments
could be argued to constitute a crime or fraud, undermining any claim
that the communication inherent in the payment is confidential. Simi-
larly, if the proceeds used to pay the lawyer are from the illegal activ-
ity, then the prosecution may argue that the funds are being hidden as
part of an ongoing conspiracy and the payment is a facet of the
crime.251 In In re Grand Jury Proceedings,2 52 Chief Judge Tjoflat of
the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit argued in a concurrence
that the exception from disclosure of client identity and fee arrange-
ments is inherently inconsistent with the crime-fraud exception and
"wholly indefensible."25 a Because the crime-fraud exception covers a
multitude of reporting statutes, many of which relate to reporting the
proceeds of business transactions and maintaining proper records, he
concluded that "when the client has been charged with misconduct in-
volving pecuniary gain and the client obviously has paid his attorney's
fees in cash, the two-prong showing required to invoke the crime/fraud
exception should be satisfied. 254
Although Chief Judge Tjoflat is correct that in many instances a
prima facie case for a crime can be shown in connection with large
cash payments, that does not automatically undermine the attorney-
client privilege inherent in the analysis of whether disclosure will also
reveal confidential communications. The better understanding is that
the exception created by the courts for protecting client identity and
250. See 26 U.S.C. § 60501 (1988). The IRS requires persons to file Form 8300, which
contains the cash payor's name and other identifying information, when they receive more than
$10,000 in cash in the course of a trade or business. Id.; see also United States v. Leventhal, 961
F.2d 936, 940-41 (1lth Cir. 1992) (enforcing IRS summons for information identifying clients
related to cash payments, and rejecting argument that providing information would violate the
attorney-client privilege); United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, P.C., 935 F.2d 501, -504-07 (2d
Cir. 1991) (enforcing IRS summonses to identify clients who paid over $10,000 in cash, and
rejecting arguments that disclosure would violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel and the attorney-client privilege).
251. It is interesting to note that the money laundering statute specifically exempts "any
transaction necessary to preserve a person's right to representation as guaranteed by the sixth
amendment to the Constitution" from the monetary transactions greater than $10,000 involving
proceeds of unlawful activity that can be prosecuted. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1) (1988). The provi-
sion's meaning is unclear because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been limited under
Caplin & Drysdale and Wheat, and a prosecutor could argue that a payment to an attorney that
exceeds $10,000, and which is made with illicit funds, is illegal because "preserving" the right to
counsel does not necessarily permit the client to have the counsel of choice.
252. 896 F.2d 1267 (11th Cir.), vacated as moot as stated in 904 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir.
1990) (en banc).
253. Id. at 1279 (Tjoflat, C.J., concurring).
254. Id. at 1281 (Tjoflat, C.J., concurring).
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fee arrangements is only a narrow extension of the attorney-client priv-
ilege that remains subject to the broad applicability of the crime-fraud
exception. The client identity and fee arrangements analysis is in fact
not an exception, but an interpretation of the privilege that does not
rest on the incriminating nature of the underlying communications. 55
The courts have been unwilling to extend the protection of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel to prohibit prosecutors from subpoe-
naing lawyers for information about their present or former clients. In
In re Grand Jury Matter,2 56 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
rejected, as improperly impairing the grand jury's investigatory func-
tion, an attorney's argument that the court impose a requirement on
prosecutors to demonstrate that the attorney is the only practical
source of the information before the subpoena can issue. The court
noted that "[s]uch a requirement would bring investigators to intermit-
tent standstills as the government set out to prove the necessity of each
piece of information it sought to obtain. ' 257 All other courts of appeals
have similarly rejected calls from attorneys and their clients to use
their supervisory powers to require prosecutors to seek judicial approval
of subpoenas for lawyers for information related to their clients.258
Massachusetts, however, has enacted a local rule that is applicable to
federal prosecutors requiring that they seek prior judicial approval of
subpoenas to attorneys; the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, sit-
ting en banc, affirmed the local rule by an equally divided court. 59 The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit refused to follow the First Cir-
255. See In re Grand Jury Matter No. 91-01386, 969 F.2d 995, 998 (11th Cir. 1992) (re-
quiring attorney to identify client who paid fee with counterfeit currency, and rejecting last link
argument because payment was not related to any confidential communications).
256. 906 F.2d 78 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 509 (1990).
257. Id. at 431-32 (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 862 F.2d 430, 431-32 (2d Cir.
1988)).
258. In re Grand Jury Matter, 926 F.2d 348, 350 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Ander-
son, 906 F.2d 1485, 1496 (10th Cir. 1990); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 862 F.2d 430, 432 (2d
Cir. 1988); United States v. Perry, 857 F.2d 1346, 1348-49 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 791 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1986); In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628, 635-36 (7th Cir.
1985); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 754 F.2d 154, 156 (6th Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings, 708 F.2d 1571, 1575 (11th Cir. 1983).
259. MASS. Sup. JUD. CT. R. 3:08; United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649 (1st Cir. 1987),
affd by an equally divided ci., 832 F.2d 664 (Ist Cir. 1987) (en banc) (per curiam). The Massa-
chusetts rule was enacted by the state's highest court and incorporated by the U.S. District Court
for the District of Massachusetts into its local rules. Klubock, 832 F.2d at 650 & n.3. The su-
preme courts of Tennessee and Virginia also adopted rules similar to the Massachusetts provision,
but the United States district courts in those states have not incorporated them into their local
rules. See Stern & Hoffman, supra note 25, at 1821.
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cuit by rejecting a similar rule for federal prosecutors in Pennsylvania,
holding that the local rule is beyond the district court's rulemaking
power, and that enforcement of the state law requirement would violate
the Supremacy Clause.
2 6 0
D. Informants and Represented Witnesses: The Limits of the Ethical
Rules
The Sixth Amendment has been interpreted by the Supreme Court
to attach only at the commencement of legal proceedings against a de-
fendant, and courts have resisted attempts to extend the protection of
the right to counsel to the pre-indictment stage of an investigation. The
fact that a witness is represented by counsel, even if known by the pros-
ecutor, does not mean that the government is constitutionally required
to have the attorney present at all contacts with the person. DR 7-
104(A)(1) of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer may not contact a party known to be represented by
counsel without the prior consent of counsel, or unless authorized by
law to contact the party.26' Defense attorneys have argued that the eth-
ical rules prohibit contact with represented witnesses and targets by
prosecutors, including indirect contact through investigatory agents and
cooperating witnesses, even if the Sixth Amendment does not have a
coextensive reach. What the Constitution may permit can arguably be
260. Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd., 975 F.2d 102, 104 (3d Cir. 1992) (adopting the rationale
of the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Campbell in Klubock). The District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania had also rejected the rule, and criticized the First Circuit's decision
as "an orphan in the federal system, and it will not find a relative here." Baylson v. Disciplinary
Bd., 764 F. Supp. 328, 343 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
261. DR 7-104(A)(1) of the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:
During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation
with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior
consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so.
The ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which have been adopted by approximately
one-half of the states, has a similar provision, Model Rule 4.2, which provides: "In representing a
client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent
of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so." There is no substantive difference between
DR 7-104 and Model Rule 4.2, and the cases raising the question of the ethical rules' scope in
criminal investigations invariably focus on DR 7-104. See Bruce A. Green, A Prosecutor's Com-
munications with Defendants: What Are the Limits?, 24 CRIM. L. BULL. 283, 284 n.5 (1988)
(stating that there is no reason to expect that language of Model Rule 4.2 will result in different
analysis from DR 7-104).
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restricted by the guidelines of the profession to limit the investigative
tactics available to the prosecution.
The ethical rules apply to all prosecutors, but it is questionable
whether DR 7-104(A)(1) reaches pre-indictment contacts with a repre-
sented person because the rule specifically restricts contact with a
"party." The Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment analysis limits the
right to counsel to the initiation of criminal charges or an arrest, at
which time a person becomes a party in an action. A number of court
of appeals have held that pre-indictment, non-custodial contacts with
represented persons do not violate the ethical rules because they do not
apply.262 Prosecutors may be prohibited from contacts with represented
persons where the meeting involves a custodial situation without the
presence or consent of retained counsel.26 3 The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, however, held in United States v. Hammad264 that
the Constitution ensures only minimal safeguards, not the limit of what
the law provides to protect defendants, and that DR 7-104's applicabil-
ity was not limited to the moment of an indictment, because the rule is
not simply coextensive with the Sixth Amendment. 65
In Hammad, the prosecutor had issued a "sham" subpoena to an
informant to use as a cover in initiating discussions with the defendant
that were taped. DR 7-104(A)(1) permits contacts with parties when
262. See United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731, 740 (10th Cir.) (holding that DR 7-
104(A)(1) does not apply "during the investigative process before the initiation of criminal pro-
ceedings."), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 152 (1990); United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1366
(D.C. Cir. 1986) ("Rule 7-104 was never meant to apply" to pre-indictmeni, non-custodial taping
of defendant); United States v. Fitterer, 710 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir.) (holding that the pre-
indictment use of an informant to contact a represented person was not a rule violation), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 852 (1983); United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1339 (9th Cir.) (stating
that investigative techniques at pre-indictment stage do not implicate problems addressed by the
ethical rules), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 920 (1981); United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941, 955
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that the ABA Model Code does not apply to taping by informant before
indictment of defendant), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974); see also Marc A. Schwartz, Note,
Prosecutorial Investigations and DR 7-104(A)(1), 89 COLUM. L. REv. 940, 952 (1989) (arguing
that best approach is to acknowledge that DR 7-104(A)(1) "simply should not apply at all to
prosecutorial investigations, thus freeing prosecutors from the threat that the fruits of their work
will be suppressed because of undefined but nevertheless 'unethical' conduct").
263. See United States v. Killian, 639 F.2d 206, 210 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1021
(1981); United States v. Durham, 475 F.2d. 208, 211 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Thomas,
474 F.2d 110, 112 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973); United States v. Lopez, 765 F.
Supp. 1433, 1448 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
264. 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 192 (1990).
265. Id. at 838-39. The court noted that prosecutors substantially control the timing of
indictment, and therefore to limit the rule to the handing up of an indictment could allow the
government to "manipulate grand jury proceedings to avoid its encumbrances." Id. at 839.
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the attorney is "authorized by law," and the court found that "the use
of informants to gather evidence against a suspect will frequently fall
within the ambit of such authorization."26 Nevertheless, the court
found that the use of a false subpoena designed to "create a pretense
that might help the informant elicit admissions from a represented sus-
pect" constituted misconduct that is not authorized by law and violated
the prosecutor's ethical duty.267
Whatever the merits of its analysis of the applicability of DR 7-
104(A)(1) to pre-indictment non-custodial contacts with represented
persons, Hammad has been rendered essentially meaningless by subse-
quent decisions. In United States v. Infelise,268 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois found no violation of
DR 7-104(A)(1) where the prosecutor issued a valid but unnecessary
subpoena to an informant to permit him to discuss the investigation
with the defendant. The subpoena in Infelise is virtually identical to
the one issued in Hammad, except that the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit chose to treat it as a "sham" while the district court
found that it was only "unnecessary." In United States v. Ryans,289 the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that issuance of a sub-
poena to an informant was an acceptable investigative technique, even
if the subpoena was unnecessary to compel the informant's appearance
before the grand jury. The Ryans court noted that permitting contacts
with represented persons may result in some interference with the at-
torney-client privilege, but it found that the white collar rationale of
preserving effective law enforcement outweighed that interestY.70 Two
decisions by district courts in the Second Circuit limited Hammad by
permitting the government to record conversations with investigative
targets even though counsel had requested that all contacts be made
through the attorney.Y
The approach taken by the courts" after Hammad is similar to that
266. Id.
267. Id. at 840.
268. 773 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Il. 1991).
269. 903 F.2d 731 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 152 (1990).
270. Id. at 740; see also Green, supra note 261, at 319 ("To the extent that DR 7-
104(A)(1) cuts back on prosecutorial and police questioning-of represented suspects and defend-
ants, it substantially undermines the important societal interest in the enforcement of criminal
laws.").
271. See United States v. Buda, 718 F. Supp. 1094, 1096 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (distinguishing
Hannad as prohibiting only egregious misconduct that violates DR 7-104(A)(1)); United States
v. Chestman, 704 F. Supp. 451, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (same), afJfd in part and rev'd in part on
other grounds, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
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taken by the Supreme Court in the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
cases where the Court exhibited its mistrust of using lawyers as a
shield for ongoing criminal activities. Extending the ethical rules to
create an absolute bar on contacts with any represented person will
permit criminal enterprises to use attorneys as a layer of protection
against an effective law enforcement tactic, the undercover informant,
without advancing the interests of preserving the adversarial process.
Indeed, the pre-indictment stage is outside the adversarial process,
making any expansion of the right to counsel questionable. 2  Even if
the contact were to violate DR 7-104(A)(1), there is no obvious rem-
edy available to cure the violation. Defendants have argued for exclud-
ing the evidence resulting from the contact, but that result is extreme
in comparison to the type of violation that occurred. In United States v.
Morrison,2 73 the Supreme Court held that the remedy for Sixth
Amendment violations must be tailored to cure the prejudice, if any,
that results from the violation, rejecting an exclusionary rule.274 Viola-
tions of the ethical rules certainly do not rise to the level of breaches of
a defendant's constitutional rights, yet adoption of an exclusionary rule
would invest defendants with greater rights than they have under the
Sixth Amendment, through a set of rules that have not been adopted
by Congress and which may arguably not even apply to criminal inves-
tigations. It is anomalous that defendants can attempt to use a set of
rules designed to govern the conduct of the legal profession to create
rights that the Supreme Court has refused to accord them.275
272. See L. Eric Johnson, The Impact of Disciplinary Rule 7-104 on Law Enforcement
Contact with Represented Persons, 40 KAN. L. REv. 63, 69-70 (Criminal Procedure Ed. 1992)
(arguing that the liberal application of DR 7-104 threatens to render irrelevant a large portion of
the Fifth and Sixth Amendment case law concerning right to counsel).
273. 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
274. Id. at 365-66.
275. See Schwartz, supra note 262, at 954 (stating that, if suppression is the appropriate
remedy, DR 7-104(A)(1) provides defendants with a broader right to counsel than the Constitu-
tion because the rule cannot be waived). Professor Green argues that courts should not interpret
the ethical rules as if they are statutes to determine the drafters' intent, but should identify the
interests that the rule is designed to protect in determining its application to criminal investiga-
tions. See Green, supra note 261, at 314-19. But see United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433,
1463-64 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (using supervisory powers to order dismissal of indictment for violation
involving post-indictment contact with defendant without informing counsel). The court in Lopez
found that the prosecutor misled a magistrate in seeking permission to meet with the defendant
without informing his counsel. Id. at 1442. That may explain why the court found the violation
sufficiently egregious to order dismissal. Lopez demonstrates that courts should directly address
the prosecutorial misconduct issue without using the ethical rules as a type of statutory basis to
order a remedy.
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Arguments concerning the application of DR 7-104(A)(1) to the
prosecutor's conduct of criminal investigations are misleading because
the real issue is one of prosecutorial misconduct. Hammad even uses
the phrase "egregious misconduct" in describing the types of acts that
are not authorized by law. The ethical rules provide a convenient
facade to argue that prosecutors have overstepped the proper bounds
for investigating criminal activity. The need to gather incriminating
statements from targets in white collar investigations has heightened
the tension between defense counsel and prosecutors because the gov-
ernment seeks direct contact with the targets outside the presence of
counsel. The proper focus should be on whether the government's con-
duct has breached the standard of fundamental fairness, constituting a
violation of the defendant's due process rights, and not whether a rule
created by the legal profession can be stretched to prevent prosecutors
from adapting traditional investigative techniques to the developing
realm of white collar criminal investigations .1 6
IV. CONCLUSION
Although courts have avoided bright-line rules in considering the
array of investigatory tactics prosecutors and investigative agents apply
to white collar investigations, they are clearly sympathetic to argu-
ments that extending the constitutional rights of investigative targets
and defendants to the pre-indictment stage will hamper the successful
prosecution of complex economic crimes. The acceptance of the white
collar rationale as a basis to permit the government to seek incriminat-
ing statements from participants, and to limit the privilege against self-
incrimination, means that the cases will continue to be decided gener-
ally in favor of the government. For example, while Hammad appears
to grant a degree of protection to represented targets, the decision is a
dead-letter. If Hammad were taken to its logical extreme, it would pre-
vent informants from using virtually any ruse to provide cover and en-
tice an investigatory target into making potentially incriminating state-
ments. If the courts change their emphasis away from considering the
276. The Justice Department's proposed rules concerning prosecutorial contacts with repre-
sented persons generally permit contacts at the pre-indictment stage and strongly limit them after
the initiation of criminal proceedings. "The proposed rules, therefore, are intended to strike an
appropriate balance between the need to protect the attorney-client relationship from unnecessary
intrusion and the need to preserve the ability of government attorneys to conduct legitimate law
enforcement activities." 57 Fed. Reg. 54,737, 54,740, 54,742 (1992) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R.
pt. 77) (proposed Nov. 20, 1992).
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need for effective enforcement of economic criminal laws, then defend-
ants will have a better chance of arguing in favor of extending the pro-
tections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
A more subtle issue that the cases raise is whether the courts are
more solicitous of lawyers than police officers when questions are raised
about investigatory tactics. The shift from street crime cases to white
collar and drug distribution cases means that prosecutors are often the
principal players for the government, and the defendants and witnesses
tend to be more sophisticated business people represented by highly
skilled private attorneys. Arguments that the government has treated a
client unfairly may be less readily acceptable given the large role attor-
neys play on both sides. The appeal to equity does not have the same
resonance, so the courts may be less willing to expand the scope of
constitutional protections that appear to hamper the government while
shielding a group that has little real need of an added layer of protec-
tion. The courts may also believe that the presence of lawyers on both
sides means there are fewer opportunities for outrageous conduct,
therefore limiting the pressure to create institutional changes in the
conduct of white collar investigations. Defendants would likely argue
that the conduct is only subtler, but no less outrageous. Nevertheless,
the trend continues in favor of the government in conducting investiga-
tions because the white collar rationale retains its appeal. Production of
business records and the ability to seek incriminating statements from
investigative targets and defendants will not become less important in
the conduct of white collar investigations, so the need to permit effec-
tive law enforcement will continue as an overriding concern in consider-
ing claims that the government has transgressed the rights of those who
participated in the series- of events under investigation.
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